Science at the Bar: Language, Scientific-technical Knowledge, and Jurisdictional Function

Abstract

The growing technicalisation of society is also evident in the forensic field, with a proliferation of scientific references, together with the increasing presence of new and sophisticated technical methods of providing evidence. The current judicial system's aptitude to deal with the new scenario has been challenged by this phenomenon. This paper undertakes the analysis of the problem, and of the inadequacy of the solutions that have been proposed, especially those that expressly or covertly attempt to replace the judge with an expert in certain cases. The author considers the need to frame the issue within the context of communication using pragmatics in order to clarify the problem, overcome the technocratic vision and recover the genuine sense of the judicial function. The conclusion maintains that scientific knowledge in legal proceedings is solely an instrument that helps the judge to assess certain types of facts. Consequently, such knowledge must be provided to the judge in a clear and intelligible manner, and the judge does not need to be an expert in the sciences related to the legal problems he or she has to resolve. The rules of burden of proof should be enough to solve the cases in which there are conflicting expert opinions.