Una mala comprensión de Wittgenstein
Autor(es) y otros:
Fecha de publicación:
1990
Editorial:
Universidad de Murcia
Citación:
Daimon: Revista de filosofía, 2, p. 217-226 (1990)
Descripción física:
p. 217-226
Resumen:
The aim of this paper is to show that Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's private languaje argument is misleading when he presents him as a sceptical. However it is argued that, in spite of this misunderstanding, Kripke reaches what possibly would be a correct answer to the rule-following problem: the community view.
The aim of this paper is to show that Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's private languaje argument is misleading when he presents him as a sceptical. However it is argued that, in spite of this misunderstanding, Kripke reaches what possibly would be a correct answer to the rule-following problem: the community view.