



Institutional and Organisational influence on Mental Health Management in Spanish and Italian Primary Care

Journal:	<i>International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy</i>
Manuscript ID	IJSSP-03-2023-0081.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	General practitioners, Street-Level Bureaucracy, Mental Health, Qualitative method, Cross-National Comparison

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Institutional and Organisational influence on Mental Health Management in Spanish and Italian Primary Care

ABSTRACT

Purpose:

This study aims to investigate how institutional and organisational factors affect case management of patients with mental disorders by GPs in Italy and Spain. The paper highlights the importance of improving the effectiveness of Primary Care to ensure easy access to mental health services, which is crucial in responding to the increasing incidence of mental disorders and preventing negative outcomes.

Design and Methodology:

This article details a qualitative research study that examines the management of patients with mental disorders by general practitioners (GPs) in Italy and Spain, using cross-national comparison and in-depth interviews with GPs as research methods.

Findings:

The study revealed that Italian self-employed GPs have more scheduling autonomy than Spanish Health Centre GPs. Both face high work pressure and resource scarcity, highlighting the need for targeted training. The COVID-19 pandemic led to a rise in phone consultations.

Originality:

This study provides novel insights into mental health management by examining the case management of patients with mental disorders by GPs in Italy and Spain, with a focus on the impact of institutional and organisational factors. The cross-national comparison and in-depth interviews enhance the originality of the study, offering a nuanced understanding of the constraints faced by GPs in their work context. Furthermore, the comparison of the similar Primary Care frameworks of Italy and Spain may offer insight into their evolution.

Keywords: General practitioners, Street-Level Bureaucracy, mental health, qualitative methods, cross-national comparison

INTRODUCTION

Promoting access to mental health (MH) services is essential for individual and community well-being, cost-effective healthcare, and advancing health equity. Given the high incidence of untreated mental disorders (Kessler *et al.*, 2005; Wittchen *et al.*, 2011), the pervasiveness of stigma, escalating healthcare costs (Doran *et al.*, 2017), and the added pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic (Asbury *et al.*, 2021; Serafini *et al.*, 2020) it is crucial to explore barriers to MH services access. Considering suicide as an indicator of mental health challenges globally, the World Health Organisation (WHO) states that for young individuals aged 15–29 years, it ranks as the fourth primary cause of death, following road injuries, tuberculosis, and interpersonal violence for both genders. Across the global population, a life is lost to suicide every 40 seconds (WHO, 2020).

Central to this discourse is the concept of patient “candidacy” (Dixon-Woods *et al.*, 2006), *i.e.*, the possibility for and ability of the individual to choose the most appropriate health service through interaction with the Welfare State and health professionals. General Practitioners (GPs) play a pivotal role in shaping this “candidacy” as they often encounter patients with psychiatric disorders and are the exclusive treaters of common ones (Grandes *et al.*, 2011; Lora, 2009; WHO, 1978).

Despite being relatively understudied (Dixon *et al.*, 2020), the role of GPs as front-line bureaucrats has the potential to provide unique insights into the dynamics of MH care (Dunham *et al.*, 2008; Wells, 1997). Drawing from Street-level Bureaucracy (SLB) Theory (Lipsky, 2010), which emphasises the interaction between users and the State by focusing on the work of front-line public workers, this study aims to examine the hypothesis that the interplay of institutional and organisational constraints influencing GPs management of patients with mental disorders. By identifying parallels and differences in the Italian and Spanish contexts, this research will explore the macro and meso mechanisms that shape GPs' management approaches.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section assesses the theoretical framework of the study, linking it with key literature findings concerning influential factors in GPs' approach to mental disorders. The second section establishes national institutional and organisational configurations. The third gives the research methodology. The fourth section presents and debates the analysis results. The paper ends with final observations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Lipsky theorises that street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) possess “discretion,” which grants them freedom and autonomy in their roles. This allows them to decide on the type, quantity, and quality of the benefits and penalties given by their organizations. Lipsky underlines that the unique nature of their jobs often necessitates a flexible approach to address the individual aspects of scenarios (Lipsky, 2010). As the author articulates: “Certain characteristics of the jobs of street-level bureaucrats make it difficult, if not impossible, to severely reduce the programmatic formats, (...), street-level bureaucrats work in situations that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations” (2010, p.16). Hupe's (2013) differentiates between two types of discretion: one determined by laws and protocols, termed “discretion as granted”, and the other being the practical autonomy exercised, called “discretion as used”.

Certainly, dealing with patients requires an understanding of the “human dimensions of situations”. This is because health is not merely about biological aspects; it also encompasses psychological and social dimensions (WHO, 1946). GPs are consistently engaged in addressing the individualised aspects of patient relationships. As both “state agents” and “citizen agents” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000), one of the key aspects of this role involves making autonomous decisions about patients' clinical paths, such as choosing when to refer patients to specialists. Their frontline position also means GPs are frequently the first to hear user complaints about the healthcare system (Forrest, 2003). In their capacity as street-level bureaucrats, GPs

1
2
3 exercise discretion, drawing from their inter-organisational informal networks to customise care
4 (Loyens, 2019). Concurrently, they champion the needs and concerns of their patients (Dunham
5 *et al.*, 2008).

6 When discussing SLBs as public service workers, it's notable that they often operate under
7 significant stress and pressure. This is primarily due to overwhelming workloads and a persistent
8 lack of resources, including time. Lipsky points out the strategies these SLBs adopt to cope. They
9 might establish routine management procedures and form anticipatory judgments about the
10 characteristics and needs of users.

11
12 Factors like decentralisation significantly affect health policy implementation. Such
13 policies, tied with discretion and autonomy (European Committee of the Regions, 2013), have
14 implications on health organisations' autonomy and coordination issues, shaping service
15 continuity and accessibility (Juliá-Sanchis *et al.*, 2020). Payment systems, too, play a pivotal role
16 in influencing GP decision-making (Bjørndal *et al.*, 1994; Gosden *et al.*, 2000; Vu *et al.*, 2021).

17
18 Specific to MH, limited resources, like consultation time, impact patient satisfaction and
19 compliance. Longer consultations generally result in better outcomes (Deveugele *et al.*, 2002;
20 Wilson & Childs, 2002) Pandemic-era remote consultations constrained the SLB's key aspect of
21 in-person contact, delaying effective communication by restricting non-verbal signs, being these
22 crucial for MH management (Foley & Gentile, 2010; Hammersley *et al.*, 2019).

23
24 Barriers such as waiting lists for MH services influence GPs' referral decisions (Goldner
25 *et al.*, 2011). Waiting lists, for instance, can worsen clinical outcomes for MH patients due to the
26 risk of deterioration (Reichert & Jacobs, 2018).

27
28 Furthermore, prescription strategies, used at times to manage time constraints, correlate
29 with increased out-of-pocket (OOP) payments (Zuvekas & Selden, 2010) and information deficits
30 (Thornicroft, 2008). Given the chronic nature of many MH disorders, OOP pose a financial risk,
31 especially for economically disadvantaged patients (Zuvekas & Selden, 2010). Training and
32 perception also come into play. GPs with misconceptions about certain disorders, like
33 schizophrenia, might view these patients as more dangerous than their better-informed peers
34 (Magliano *et al.*, 2017).

35
36 Having explored the discretion inherent in GP roles, it is also necessary to understand the
37 broader primary care frameworks in which they operate. Bourgueil *et al.* (2009), delve into this
38 by identifying three models of primary care. The first is the "Non-hierarchical professional",
39 spearheaded by health professionals without a unified primary care approach, often missing
40 specific ambulatory care provisions. The second, the "Public Hierarchical Normative" (as
41 observed in Spain), positions primary care under state oversight, with facilities frequently run by
42 local entities and salaried GPs. The third, the "Professional Hierarchical Gatekeeper" (exemplified
43 by the United Kingdom), revolves around self-employed GPs who oversee access to services and
44 resource management. These classifications exist along a spectrum, and hybrid models are
45 commonly adopted. For instance, both Italy and France generally tend towards a hybrid approach
46 (Bourgueil *et al.*, 2009; Kringos *et al.*, 2015a).

47
48 In summary, the role of SLBs, particularly GPs, is multifaceted, shaped by both the
49 discretion inherent in their positions and the broader policy and resource environments in which
50 they operate. Lipsky's insights on discretion provides a foundational understanding of the
51 decision-making processes at the frontlines of public service.

52
53 As exemplified in the context of MH management, various elements, from consultation
54 time and decentralisation policies to training and perceptions, significantly influence GPs'
55 decision-making. Furthermore, the three models of primary care outlined by Bourgueil *et al.*
56 (2009) display the diverse structures in which GPs work.

57 NATIONAL COMPARISON

58
59
60

In Spain, the General Health Act (1986) established the National Health Systems (NHS) in conjunction with its European Union (EU) accession, reflecting the principles of Universal Coverage (Kringos *et al.*, 2015b). Conversely, Italy had already paved the way for its NHS in 1978.

Spain's journey through the deinstitutionalisation was documented in the Report for Psychiatric Reform in 1985 and the Health law of 1986 which included psychiatry within the specialisations of the Health System (Aparicio Basauri, 1993; Guillén & Cabiedes, 1997). The NHS Strategy for MH in 2007 further consolidated this roadmap (Juliá-Sanchis *et al.*, 2020). Parallely, Italy started deinstitutionalization in 1978, thanks to Law 180. From this moment admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals were halted, and a patient-centred approach emerged (Barbui *et al.*, 2018). Both countries face issues coordinating MH, PHC and, social services, crucial for community-based mental disorder treatment (Salvador-Carulla *et al.*, 2005).

Regarding decentralisation, in Spain, the need for political stability after the dictatorship led to the transfer of the management of public services from the Central Government to Regional Governments (Guillén and Cabiedes, 1997; Vázquez-Barquero *et al.*, 2001). Italy saw its healthcare regionalization culminate in 1999, but subsequent policies ensured universal coverage and free service delivery persisted. Still, co-payment strategies introduced periodic dynamics into the system (Kringos *et al.*, 2015b).

Regarding drugs, Spain tops the global ranking for benzodiazepine consumption with 110 daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants (DHD/1000 inhabitants) in 2021 (INCB, 2022). The growing trend in anxiolytics and hypnotics usage, which escalated during the pandemic, saw an increase in the defined daily dose per 1,000 inhabitants from 82.51 in 2010 to 93.05 in 2021 (Ministerio de Sanidad, 2022). During recent years, the psychotropic drugs (antidepressants, antipsychotics, and benzodiazepines) consumption in Italy, is a stable trend with a slight increase in benzodiazepine use. The average consumption of antidepressants stood at 40 DHD/1000 inhabitants from 2015 to 2017, while antipsychotic consumption held steady at 9 DHD/1000 inhabitants over the same period (AIFA, 2022).

On the professional front, GPs in Spain, salaried public servants, work full-time in multidisciplinary Health Centres. These centres operate 24/7. Each centre has a coordinator for shift organisation and minimal sanctioning responsibility (Kringos *et al.*, 2015b). Contrarily, Italian GPs, categorised as public self-employed workers, in 2009 signed an agreement with Regions and the NHS to assure the community of "basic levels of care", and continuous care services 24/7 (Kroneman, 2011). To reach this goal, "aggregated functional local units" (AFTs) were created. GPs must offer five days a week of in-person consultations and two daily hours of phone availability from 8.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. for urgent requests. (SISAC, 2009). Recently Italy has fostered multidisciplinary Health Centres mirroring the Spanish PHC model.

Differences also exist in terms of "self-reported unmet needs for health care" (Table 1) Italy presents worse data than Spain. The perspective of Italian patients underscores the gaps in service provision, particularly regarding waiting lists.

Table 1. Reasons for self-reported unmet needs for health care*

	Financial reasons	Distance or transportation	Waiting lists
EU 27	13.0	4.0	19.4
Spain	10.3	1.1	13.0
Italy	13.6	8.3	25.2

Note: *measurement units represent % of responding people
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2021b)

Public fiscal constraints carried out during 2009-2011, intensifying Italian waiting list problems (Pavolini *et al.*, 2015) prompting an increase in private occupational health coverage

(Petmesidou *et al.*, 2020). Similarly, Spain saw a substantial increase in the public perception of extended waiting times, suggesting parallel availability and accessibility challenges in both countries (*ibidem*). Table 2 resumes the two national characteristics.

Table 2. Spain and Italy: A Comparative Analysis of Key Indicators

	Spain	Italy
Universal Health Coverage via Public-Private Partnerships	✓	✓
Decentralisation	✓	✓
Deinstitutionalisation	✓	✓
GPs as Gatekeepers of NHS	✓	✓
GP Remuneration	Salary	Capitation
GP Status	Public Servants	Self-employed Public Servants
Number of GPs in 2020 (per 100,000 inhabitants). EU average 78.33 ⁽¹⁾	91.42*	70.16
Psychiatric Hospital Beds (per 100,000 population). EU average: 73 ⁽²⁾	36	9
Psychiatrists (per 100,000 population). EU average: 17 ⁽³⁾	11	17
Health Expenditure (% of GDP). EU average: 8.1% ⁽⁴⁾	7.3%	7.6%
OOP (USD per capita). EU average: 684.14 ⁽⁵⁾	858 (21% of total health expenditure)	885 (21.89% of total health expenditure)
Mental Health Expenditure (as % of total government health expenditures). EU average: 6.21 ⁽⁶⁾	5%	5%

Note: *data from Spain does not differentiate between General Practitioners and Generalist Medical Practitioners.
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2023b) ¹; EUROSTAT (2021) ²; EUROSTAT (2020) ³; EUROSTAT (2023) ⁴; OECD (2023) ⁵; WHO (2013) ⁶

In summary, Italy and Spain, embodying the Southern European (SE) Welfare State Model, transitioned from occupation-focused to universal healthcare models from the 1980s (Ferrera, 1996). The interplay between public and private sectors is orchestrated to achieve optimal efficiency within cost containment (Petmesidou *et al.*, 2014). Spanish Primary Care, marked by protocolised Health Centres, decentralisation, limited funding, cost control, and Regional Government roles (Pavolini *et al.*, 2015; van der Tier *et al.*, 2021), aligns with the 'Public Hierarchical Normative' model (Kringos *et al.*, 2015a). Italian PHC integrates advanced strategies, capitation-based pay, cost control, and fiscal regulation. Its governance is an amalgamation of the "Public Hierarchical Normative" and "Professional Hierarchical

1
2
3 Gatekeeper" models. This hybrid approach underscores the importance of innovation within a
4 traditional bureaucratic framework (Kringos *et al.*, 2015a). Pertinent to this, there's a significant
5 shift towards health centres in Italy, even while retaining a self-employed framework.
6 Concurrently, an internal discourse is underway, deliberating the potential transition to a full
7 public servant role.
8

9 10 **METHODOLOGY**

11 ***Research Design***

12
13 A cross-national qualitative study was conducted using primary and secondary data, with
14 the latter offering context to interpret the role and influence of GPs within the broader healthcare
15 system. The comparison between the institutional and organisational landscapes of Spain and
16 Italy could shed light on variations in GPs' patient management.
17
18

19 ***Data Collection and Analysis***

20
21 To compare Italian and Spanish cases, ten GPs from the Health Service of Asturias (SESPA),
22 Spain, and ten GPs from the Health Service of Central Tuscany (AUSL Toscana-Centro), Italy,
23 were interviewed between June and November 2022. In the comparative analysis, the primary
24 focus is on contrasting Spain and Italy. While the two geographical areas share certain
25 characteristics, such as a population size of around one million, the GPs selected from these
26 regions aren't intended to represent the entire national sample.
27

28 After the Ethical Research Committee of Asturias approval, the research proposal
29 was presented to local Public Health Organisations, looking for GPs who were willing to
30 participate, assuring anonymity and the possibility of withdrawing from the study. After first
31 positive feedback, the sampling process continued by applying the "snowball" technique
32 (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). The recruiting process stopped once the saturation point was
33 reached (Francis *et al.*, 2010). To test the length and appropriateness of questions, three pilot
34 interviews with Spanish GPs were conducted prior to the process of data collection, but these
35 were not included in the sample.
36

37 Almost all the interviews took place at doctors' practices. In a few cases, they were
38 conducted by video call. All interviews were audio-recorded and conducted in GPs' language. A
39 short socio-demographic questionnaire was made before the beginning of the interview.
40

41 The open-ended interview topics were chosen starting from the macro and meso topics
42 that could influence GPs' management of patients with mental disorders based on the literature.
43 The interview also explored topics based on SLB Theory, *e.g.*, discretionality, autonomy, lack of
44 resources, their relationship with the first-line supervisor, and the presence of protocols that could
45 limit their autonomy. In addition, open-ended questions investigated the impact of the COVID-
46 19 pandemic.
47

48 The researcher's "suspension of judgement" (Lindseth and Norberg, 2004) was
49 emphasised to create a welcoming atmosphere favouring the prevention of social desirability bias
50 (Bergen and Labonté, 2020).
51

52 To fully preserve the meaning and the experiences of the interviewee (Lindseth and
53 Norberg, 2004), audio records were transcribed and analysed in Italian and Spanish. The
54 categorization and analysis processes were conducted with MaxQDA. Formulating an initial set
55 of codes through inductive and theoretical approaches, the process of identifying and categorizing
56 the data that were relevant to the research was carried out. In addition, a deductive categorization
57 process was used in conjunction with an abductive approach, in order to anticipate the possibility
58 of data not fitting into pre-established categories (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). A narrative that
59 represents the data was woven together with the assistance of broad themes and trends, discerned
60

through a secondary phase of coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Table 3 presents a summary of the participants.

Table 3. Summary of the participants


PART.	GENDER	AGE	N° P	MC/DAY	HC
GP1S	F	55	1600	40	Yes
GP2S	M	48	1503	43	Yes
GP3S	F	59	1250	38	Yes
GP4S	F	31	1000	40	Yes
GP5S	F	59	1600	40	Yes
GP6S	M	64	1300	30	Yes
GP7S	M	60	1690	40	Yes
GP8S	M	64	1500	44	Yes
GP9S	M	28	—	—	Yes
GP10S	F	43	1400	50	Yes
GP1I	M	40	1500	27	Yes
GP2I	M	36	1500	20	No
GP3I	M	35	1550	31	Yes
GP4I	F	43	1300	28	No
GP5I	F	35	1200	15	Yes
GP6I	F	44	2020	21	Yes
GP7I	F	36	1700	38	No
GP8I	M	67	1200	28	No
GP9I	F	44	1750	40	No
GP10I	F	33	200	6	Yes

Note: The first ten GPs (above the black line) are Spanish (S), the second ten are Italian (I). GP9S is a residential doctor. N° P=Number of patients. MC/DAY=Medical Consultations per Day (including face-to-face, telephone, and house visit consultations.) HC=working in a Health Centre.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

In this section, the most salient topics that appeared during interviews are presented (Miles and Huberman, 1994) according to the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Impact of Institutional and Organisational Factors on GPs' Mental Health Management



Degree of Government Funding

Within the overarching objective of enhancing efficiency and reducing costs, it has been previously highlighted that GPs in both Italy and Spain are assigned financial responsibilities. GPs assume that their role as civil servants involves managing national financial resources, in terms of prescribing drugs and referring patients for specialised care. Both National Organisations constrain and allow GPs discretion by providing for supervision of spending, but with no sanctions for overspending. This GP expresses how organisational economic supervision influences his management:

“...it was a case in which I put a patient’s life at risk for economic reasons because otherwise, it would never have occurred to me doing this evaluation” (GP11).

In practical terms, this implies handling significant administrative paperwork and, as a consequence, the time available for managing patients, particularly important in mental disorders (Hutton and Gunn, 2007). This Italian GP reports his difficulties with the management of time due to administrative paperwork:

“We are so accustomed to the bureaucracy that I can’t even distinguish it from ordinary work. Regarding a working day, if it goes well, 40% is dedicated to patients. The rest is repeat prescriptions, putting together treatment plans, listing requests, correcting prescriptions made by specialists” (GP11).

As many GPs state, patients who present with psychological and emotional frailty need more time than a patient who is talking about a physical problem:

1
2
3 *“You have eight minutes per consultation. There are consultations that are five*
4 *minutes too long, especially bureaucratic ones, and there are consultations where*
5 *you deal with a stressful situation, mood disorder... these eight minutes cannot be*
6 *established” (GP7S).*
7

8
9 As previously noted, the management behaviour of GPs is influenced by the presence of
10 waiting lists, which are in turn related to the measures of public cost containment. To avoid
11 waiting lists, GP also can contact Public MH Services directly. This is more usual in the case of
12 the Italian GPs, maybe due to their higher level of autonomy, and it also depends on the specialist
13 service in the region, seeking shortcuts to help their patients (Wells, 1997). In other words, they
14 discretionally resort to their inter-organisational informal network to personalise what they can
15 offer (Loyens, 2019) advocating for their patients (Dunham *et al.*, 2008):
16

17
18 *“It can happen that you refer someone for a specialist visit, with a 30-day priority*
19 *and they give the patient an appointment in four months’ time... I must ‘force their*
20 *hand’, to make it a more urgent priority” (GP3I).*
21

22 Data retrieved show how waiting lists for specialised mental care also influence the
23 interviewed GPs’ management behaviour. An Italian GP recognises that she chooses to refer to a
24 private mental health specialist to avoid waiting lists and ensure that her patients gain quick access
25 (dynamics in adult care differ, but what remains crucial is the doctor's approach to management):
26

27
28 *“I now have a 13-year-old girl... Paediatric neuropsychiatry does not work, because*
29 *it has very long waiting times...and sometimes I turn to the private specialists”*
30 *(GP6I).*
31

32 Lack of time also influences drugs prescription (Thornicroft, 2008). Investigating the
33 topic further, analysis of the GP interviews reveals that prescribing drugs is a common strategy
34 due to the lack of time. One GP presents these considerations:
35

36
37 *“Obviously the drug is more comfortable, quicker... a drug is easier to give to the*
38 *patient, instead of understanding why he may have a problem and trying to solve it*
39 *in another way” (GP6I).*
40

41 GPs also stated that they are trying to reduce their use of drugs. The main difficulty they
42 reported in achieving this is the lack of time. Also, GPs commented that during the pandemic
43 there was a trend towards medicalisation, leading to an increase in patients requesting medication,
44 and a decreased tolerance for suffering.

45 Another factor influencing GPs' management of MH disorders is training (Thornicroft,
46 2008). The most common mental disorders in PHC, *i.e.*, affective, anxiety, and somatoform (Roca
47 *et al.*, 2009), have complex origins. Effective management by GPs requires a blend of specific
48 medical knowledge and emotional skills. Rather than expressing psychological distress directly,
49 individuals often seek remedies for somatic symptoms. An experienced Spanish general
50 practitioner discusses the general rule when prescribing drugs for “difficult” patients:
51

52
53 *“What we usually do when we don’t know what to do is to prescribe. ‘Take this. Out.’*
54 *You ask me for help, I’m supposed to give it to you. I don’t know how to give it to*
55 *you” (GP6S).*
56

57 The physicians interviewed report a lack of specific MH training at medical school. What
58 they seek is not specialised training in psychiatry but specific information on how to treat common
59 disorders and how to manage and refer patients with serious disorders, while giving them some
60 primary help.

Both Spanish and Italian GPs acknowledge that patients with specific disorders cause rejection and fear, and as is well known, prejudices arise from a lack of knowledge. In these cases, GPs choose to refer the patient to a specialist or prescribe drugs. In cases of serious disorders, their perceived accountability decreases. These results are well summarised in these doctors' statements:

"Especially for me, the patient with psychosis was very scary. So much so that I was terrified because I don't know how to treat them" (GP7I).

"For example, in women diagnosed with fibromyalgia, there are prejudices. Some professionals do not feel at all comfortable. They are very difficult pathologies to treat, and there is rarely success" (GP2S).

Anticipated failure and perceived inability to deal with the problem also play a role in rejecting these patients. Coping with lack of resources, fast referral, prescribing drugs, and discomfort based on prejudices become routine (Lipsky, 2010). These are used to simplify the GPs' work and facilitate their management of users' demands. In summary, these coping mechanisms are implemented to overcome the "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957) between their clinical role and their perceived incapacity to manage patients with serious mental disorders.

Decentralisation of Health System

In Italy, private consultations potentially offer enhanced accessibility to GPs for patients. An Italian GP elaborates on this, emphasizing his personal guidelines which are crafted in accordance with the broader Health System rules:

"If there is an emergency, for example a fever of 38 and the patient can't go to work or even more serious things, they call me in the morning from 08 to 10 and I always see them during the day anyway. Either in the consult or I go to see them at home if they call me by 10 a.m. If they call me after 10 a.m. they can contact me leaving a message to the administrative staff" (GP1I)

Existing literature highlights that, despite Italian GPs having higher accessibility, they hold fewer daily consultations compared to their Spanish counterparts, making more difficult the access to specialised care (Garattini *et al.*, 2023). Another consequence is that PHC in Italy is bypassed because of patients' direct access to Hospital Emergency or Private Services. It is not possible to exclude the likelihood that some of these patients might require psychological care:

"You can't manage all the requests you have. So, in 20 to 30% of cases, you are bypassed, and the patient goes directly to the hospital. Therefore, you no longer work as an access door. You are overwhelmed or patients go to the private system" (GP7I).

Reflecting on the responsibilities and privileges of being a GP in a front-line role as a public servant, these Spanish GPs emphasise the crucial role of accessibility in establishing trust with patients and guiding their journey through the Health System. Given the vulnerability of patients with mental disorders, these considerations become even more significant:

"We have a big responsibility since we need a very big knowledge. We must generate sufficient confidence in patients so that they also consider us an adequate filter so as not to overload or saturate the health system" (GP5S).

"I believe that the family doctor is the fundamental pivot where people's health should rotate. You have a complete version of the disease's social determinants. You follow people in their environment, you know their neighbourhood, how they live"

1
2
3 *and with who. This gives you much more information than in hospital care*
4 *specialties" (GP7S).*
5

6 Regarding access to PHC, after the pandemic, the doctors' management of patients has
7 moved towards a more computerised mode. Face-to-face consultation is no longer the main
8 management tool as phone consultation became an important instrument in GPs' patient
9 management.

10 Additionally, Italian GPs count on the use of social networks as a coping strategy to gather
11 information and coordinate activities, enabling them to respond to the surge in patient demands
12 and stay updated on the latest guidelines for pandemic management, thereby becoming part of the
13 Organisational Communicative Infrastructure. The unplanned use of a technological instrument
14 emerged to meet the needs of informal intra-organisational networks (Loyens, 2019) to
15 communicate fast and comprehensive information.
16

17 The usefulness of chat applications for contacting both patients and colleagues is very
18 clear from these Italian GPs' interviews:
19

20
21 *"The change which has ballooned greatly is that of the digital-IT component. So,*
22 *email, WhatsApp, and more. This aspect became very important. Home visits have*
23 *also decreased, which were sometimes just courtesy visits in a sense. Because*
24 *(during the pandemic) you couldn't go, except in special cases" (GP8I).*
25

26 However, it must be considered that in chat communication, there is a lack of verbal and
27 non-verbal components that are essential for the expression and understanding of fundamental
28 meanings related to MH.
29

30 **Model of Primary Care Organisation**

31
32 Based on the data, it appears that the self-employed regime in Italy promotes a patient-
33 centred approach, whereas the salaried regime in Spain makes corporatist influences more
34 powerful. Closeness to the doctor could be a preventative and protective factor in the case of
35 mental health disorders, favouring early detection and prevention of a mental disorder. This Italian
36 GP reflects on the impact of the pandemic on her close relationship with patients:
37
38

39 *... we felt a great distance with people at the beginning... we were in danger*
40 *of losing contact, of not being able to perhaps have the neighbour who passes by and*
41 *asks you how the neighbour is doing (GP10I).*
42

43 Currently, there's a debate among two generations of Italian GPs. The older GPs strongly
44 support the liberal profession, while the younger ones lean towards the Spanish model:
45

46 *There is a risk of no longer being at the service of the patient. I am the*
47 *caregiver of the patient. Because then, as is happening now, the let's say corporatist*
48 *component is taking over, in its pros and cons. Let me be clear, this is not a criticism.*
49 *But I feel that my client is my patient, not the healthcare system. Among colleagues*
50 *of my generation there is this opinion (GP8I).*
51

52
53 *"In my opinion, a GP should be a civil servant like all other public professionals*
54 *This is to avoid excesses of conflicts of interest and to be able to give common*
55 *objectives to the professional category, to all GPs and, together, also to the State"*
56 *(GP10I).*
57

58 Regarding autonomy, Spanish GPs cannot full organise their own schedule due to their
59 work relationship with the NHS. Their diaries are organised by administrative staff. A Spanish
60 GP reflects on the discretion of the health administrative staff and its impact on his work:

1
2
3
4 *“They are the ones who organise my schedule, my work. If they organise it badly,*
5 *for me it is a disaster. That influences me in my relationship with a patient. ...*
6 *Imagine if everyone who comes wants to see me at the moment. The administrative*
7 *staff says (to the patient) - What do you want? – A prescription for a blood analysis*
8 *- Well, don't worry, is not urgent. Come tomorrow at 10 -. And there is no problem.*
9 *Imagine if that they say - Go upstairs (to see the doctor) -. And everyone who comes,*
10 *goes upstairs ... I don't have time to see everyone, I get angry” (GP6S).*
11

12
13 Even so, the perceived autonomy and accountability level is still high, as evidenced in the
14 words of this GP:

15
16 *“In the consultations, you have absolute freedom. I am not controlled, I own my*
17 *consultation, and I own the decisions I make. It is a huge autonomy, therefore, I do*
18 *not have the rigidity of public servants” (GP6S).*
19

20
21 Regarding autonomy and the bureaucratic workload, GPs from both Spain and Italy broadly
22 agree that administrative staff could offer a solution and extend the length of the health
23 consultation. In Italy, administrative staff are employed by the GPs, while in Spain they are public
24 employees too. In Italy, GPs can select administrative staff based on specific criteria, whereas in
25 Spain staff are assigned to a Health Centre based on a public entrance exam. The important work
26 of the administrators is both to inform and to filter:
27

28 *“We have a girl who has agreed to work with us... She is a person with many skills*
29 *and competence.... She also quantifies the health needs a little. When she is not here,*
30 *the phone calls double. So, this means that she can attend to all non-medical needs”*
31 *(GP10I).*
32

33 CONCLUSIONS

34
35 This comparative analysis of GPs in Italy and Spain offers crucial insights into the SLB Theory
36 and MH literature. The investigation proposes a focus on top-down generative mechanisms
37 affecting MH management.
38

39 Italy and Spain's healthcare systems present interesting, shared priorities alongside unique
40 system-specific elements. These countries' professional models significantly shape healthcare
41 approaches. While Italian GPs in a self-employed model often show a less corporate perspective,
42 Spanish GPs in the salaried model demonstrate strong organisational commitment. Yet, regardless
43 of these divergent models, GPs in both nations strive for efficient national resource management,
44 evidenced by their cost-conscious decisions regarding prescriptions and specialist referrals.
45 Concerning private referrals, Italian GPs, enjoying greater autonomy and discretion, sometimes
46 refer patients privately. Conversely, Spanish GPs, whose salaried status may cultivate
47 organisational alignment, typically eschew such practices.
48

49 In Italy, direct patient-GP contact strengthens doctor-patient relationship, underscoring
50 the autonomy of the self-employed model and GPs large discretionary potential. Spain's model,
51 meanwhile, leans bureaucratic, with appointments made via administrative staff. Italian GPs'
52 schedule flexibility and patient interaction possibly aid MH management. In contrast, Spanish
53 GPs' health centre ties restrict their scheduling flexibility, but they still maintain significant
54 autonomy.
55

56 Despite these variances, there are universal issues. GPs in both Italy and Spain express
57 concerns about the lack of specific MH training. This gap often leads to coping strategies when
58 dealing with patients with certain disorders, such as routinised referrals or prescriptions, which
59 may not always be the most optimal treatment approach. This could be symptomatic of the
60 persistent societal prejudice and "soft institutionalism" (Basaglia & Basaglia Ongaro, 1966).

Biased medical practice leads to the control or alteration of individuals through medication rather than through physical institutional confines. The over-reliance on drugs appears particularly pronounced in Spain, as evidenced by prescription data.

The research also highlighted that GPs in both nations struggle with resource constraints, particularly time. The bureaucratic workload, exacerbated by the pandemic, reduces the time available for patient care, relevant for those with MH issues. However, Italian GPs can contract administrative staff to manage non-clinical patient needs and reduce bureaucracy.

In essence, this study reveals a complex interplay between shared healthcare objectives and unique systemic characteristics within the Italian and Spanish healthcare systems. It underscores how professional models and bureaucratic structures can influence the pathway to achieving these objectives, but they don't completely determine the functionality or effectiveness of the healthcare system.

This study enhances the SLB Theory by highlighting how professional structures influence discretionary practices, evidenced by the cost-saving behaviours of Italian and Spanish GPs. The identified gap in MH training illuminates an area for theoretical expansion, particularly in the influence of professional expertise on discretion. Prejudices affecting the relationship with specific patients were attributed to a lack of training in mental health. Furthermore, by studying often overlooked Southern European contexts, characterised by limited resources, low spending, and service management decentralisation, this research amplifies the comparative scope of the theory.

This article could aid policymakers by highlighting the multifaceted factors shaping the realities and practices of GPs, thereby informing strategies for the development of effective and resilient PHC systems ensuring fair access to high-quality MH services. The limitations mentioned should also be considered in the formulation of future research and policy design, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of all factors at play.

Primary limitations of this study arise from its methodology and specific variable focus. The sampling process may have yielded an unrepresentative sample, potentially skewing the depiction of the phenomenon under investigation. Given the decentralization and regional differences, these results could differ within the two NHS systems. Responses might be influenced by desirability bias. However, efforts were made to minimise this by ensuring anonymity and creating a welcoming atmosphere. Last, the scope of the research was confined to topics pertinent to the dynamics under scrutiny. Future research could involve interviews with MH patients and first-line supervisors to provide a fuller understanding of the several factors influencing GPs' MH management.

In conclusion, this analysis reveals the evolving dynamics within both the Italian and Spanish healthcare systems. Notably, Italy, capitalising on its private consulta model, is beginning to implement a Spanish-like system of health centres. Ultimately, considering the NHS's resilience during the pandemic, these findings attest to the inherent dynamism within health systems, underscoring the crucial role of ongoing adaptation in response to evolving internal and external factors.

REFERENCES

- AIFA. (2022). *L'uso dei farmaci in Italia—Rapporto OsMed 2021*. <https://www.aifa.gov.it/documents/20142/1740782/Rapporto-OsMed-2021.pdf>
- Aparicio Basauri, V. (1993). La reforma psiquiátrica de 1985. In *Evaluación de servicios de Salud Mental* (pp. 127–182). Asociación Española de Neuropsiquiatría.
- Asbury, K., Fox, L., Deniz, E., Code, A., & Toseeb, U. (2021). How is COVID-19 affecting the mental health of children with special educational needs and disabilities and their

- families? *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 51(5), 1772–1780.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-020-04577-2>
- Barbui, C., Papola, D., & Saraceno, B. (2018). Forty years without mental hospitals in Italy. *International Journal of Mental Health Systems*, 12(1), 43.
<https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-018-0223-1>
- Basaglia, F., & Basaglia Ongaro, F. (1966). A problem of institutional psychiatry. Exclusion as a socio-psychiatric category. *Rivista sperimentale di freniatria e medicina legale delle alienazioni mentali*, 90(6), 1484–1503. Scopus.
- Bergen, N., & Labonté, R. (2020). “Everything is perfect, and we have no problems”: Detecting and limiting social desirability bias in qualitative research. *Qualitative Health Research*, 30(5), 783–792. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732319889354>
- Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: Problems and techniques of chain referral sampling. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 10(2), 141–163.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/004912418101000205>
- Bjørndal, A., Arntzen, E., & Johansen, A. (1994). Salaried and fee-for-service general practitioners: Is there a difference in patient turnover? *Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health Care*, 12(3), 209–213. <https://doi.org/10.3109/02813439409003701>
- Bourgueil, Y., Marek, A., & Mousquès. (2009). *Three models of primary care organisation in Europe Canada, Australia and New Zealand*. 189(141), 1–6.
- Deveugele, M., Derese, A., van den Brink-Muinen, A., Bensing, J., & De Maeseneer, J. (2002). Consultation length in general practice: Cross sectional study in six European countries. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, 325(7362), 472.
- Dixon, S., Hinton, L., & Ziebland, S. (2020). Supporting patients with female genital mutilation in primary care: A qualitative study exploring the perspectives of GPs’ working in England. *British Journal of General Practice*, 70(699), e749–e756.
<https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp20X712637>
- Dixon-Woods, M., Cavers, D., Agarwal, S., Annandale, E., Arthur, A., Harvey, J., Hsu, R., Katbamna, S., Olsen, R., Smith, L., Riley, R., & Sutton, A. J. (2006). Conducting a critical interpretive synthesis of the literature on access to healthcare by vulnerable groups. *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, 6(1), 35. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-6-35>
- Doran, C. M., Kinchin, I., Doran, C. M., & Kinchin, I. (2017). A review of the economic impact of mental illness. *Australian Health Review*, 43(1), 43–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1071/AH16115>
- Dubois, A., & Gadde, L.-E. (2002). Systematic combining: An abductive approach to case research. *Journal of Business Research*, 55(7), 553–560. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963\(00\)00195-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963(00)00195-8)
- Dunham, A. A., Scheid, T. L., & Brandon, W. P. (2008). Physicians as advocates for their patients: Depression treatment in primary care. In *Research in the Sociology of Health Care* (Vol. 26, pp. 141–165). Emerald (MCB UP). [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0275-4959\(08\)26007-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0275-4959(08)26007-2)
- European Committee of the Regions. (2013). *The management of health systems in the EU Member States: The role of local and regional authorities*. Publications Office.

- 1
2
3 [https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/health-systems/health-systems-](https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/health-systems/health-systems-en.pdf)
4 [en.pdf](https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/health-systems/health-systems-en.pdf)
5
- 6 EUROSTAT. (2020). *Number of psychiatrists: How do countries compare?*
7 <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20200506-1>
8
- 9 EUROSTAT. (2021a). *Hospital beds by type of care—Historical data (1960-2020)* [dataset].
10 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_RS_BDS/default/table?lang=en
11
- 12 EUROSTAT. (2021b). *Self-reported unmet needs for health care* [dataset].
13 [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_EHIS_UN1E/default/table?lang](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_EHIS_UN1E/default/table?lang=en)
14 [=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_EHIS_UN1E/default/table?lang=en)
15
- 16 EUROSTAT. (2023a). *General government expenditure by function* [dataset].
17 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/page/GOV_10A_EXP
18
- 19 EUROSTAT. (2023b). *Physicians by category* [dataset].
20 [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_RS_PHYSCAT__custom_73635](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_RS_PHYSCAT__custom_7363516/default/table?lang=en)
21 [16/default/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_RS_PHYSCAT__custom_7363516/default/table?lang=en)
22
- 23 Ferrera, M. (1996). IL MODELLO SUD-EUROPEO DI WELFARE STATE. *Italian Political*
24 *Science Review/Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica*, 26(1), 67–101.
25 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0048840200024047>
26
- 27 Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (Vol. 2). Stanford university press.
28
- 29 Foley, G. N., & Gentile, J. P. (2010). Nonverbal communication in psychotherapy. *Psychiatry*
30 *(Edgmont (Pa.: Township))*, 7(6), 38–44.
31
- 32 Forrest, C. B. (2003). Primary care gatekeeping and referrals: Effective filter or failed
33 experiment? *Bmj*, 326(7391), 692–695.
34
- 35 Francis, J. J., Johnston, M., Robertson, C., Glidewell, L., Entwistle, V., Eccles, M. P., &
36 Grimshaw, J. M. (2010). What is an adequate sample size? Operationalising data
37 saturation for theory-based interview studies. *Psychology and Health*, 25(10), 1229–
38 1245. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08870440903194015>
39
- 40 Garattini, L., Nobili, A., Badinella Martini, M., & Mannucci, P. M. (2023). The role of general
41 practitioners in the EU: Time to draw lessons from a too wide range? *Internal and*
42 *Emergency Medicine*. Scopus. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11739-023-03205-y>
43
- 44 Goldner, E. M., Jones, W., & Fang, M. L. (2011). Access to and Waiting Time for Psychiatrist
45 Services in a Canadian Urban Area: A Study in Real Time. *The Canadian Journal of*
46 *Psychiatry*, 56(8), 474–480. <https://doi.org/10.1177/070674371105600805>
47
- 48 Gosden, T., Forland, F., Kristiansen, I., Sutton, M., Leese, B., Giuffrida, A., Sergison, M., &
49 Pedersen, L. (2000). Capitation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed systems of payment:
50 Effects on the behaviour of primary care physicians. *Cochrane Database of Systematic*
51 *Reviews*, 3. <https://doi.org/10.1002%2F14651858.CD002215>
52
- 53 Grandes, G., Montoya, I., Arietaleanizbeaskoa, M. S., Arce, V., & Sanchez, A. (2011). The
54 burden of mental disorders in primary care. *European Psychiatry*, 26(7), 428–435.
55 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2010.11.002>
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Guillén, A. M., & Cabiedes, L. (1997). Towards a National Health Service in Spain: The search
4 for equity and efficiency. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 7(4), 319–336.
5 <https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879700700403>
6
- 7 Hammersley, V., Donaghy, E., Parker, R., McNeilly, H., Atherton, H., Bikker, A., Campbell, J.,
8 & McKinstry, B. (2019). Comparing the content and quality of video, telephone, and
9 face-to-face consultations: A non-randomised, quasi-experimental, exploratory study in
10 UK primary care. *British Journal of General Practice*, 69(686), e595–e604.
11 <https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp19X704573>
12
- 13 Hupe, P. (2013). Dimensions of Discretion: Specifying the Object of Street-Level Bureaucracy
14 Research. *Dms – Der Moderne Staat – Zeitschrift Für Public Policy, Recht Und*
15 *Management*, 6(2–2013), 425–440. <https://doi.org/10.3224/dms.v6i2.10>
16
- 17 Hutton, C., & Gunn, J. (2007). Do longer consultations improve the management of psychological
18 problems in general practice? A systematic literature review. *BMC Health Services*
19 *Research*, 7, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-7-71>
20
- 21 INCB. (2022). *Psychotropic substances: Statistics for 2020*. United Nations.
22 <https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2022.html>
23
- 24 Juliá-Sanchis, R., Aguilera-Serrano, C., Megías-Lizancos, F., & Martínez-Riera, J. R. (2020).
25 Evolución y estado del modelo comunitario de atención a la salud mental. Informe
26 SESPAS 2020. *Gaceta Sanitaria*, 34, 81–86.
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gaceta.2020.06.014>
28
- 29 Kessler, R. C., Demler, O., Frank, R. G., Olfson, M., Pincus, H. A., Walters, E. E., Wang, P.,
30 Wells, K. B., & Zaslavsky, A. M. (2005). Prevalence and treatment of mental disorders,
31 1990 to 2003. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 352(24), 2515–2523.
32 <https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa043266>
33
- 34 Kringos, D. S., Boerma, W. G. W., Hutchinson, A., & Saltman, R. B. (Eds.). (2015a). *Building*
35 *primary care in a changing Europe*. European Observatory on Health Systems and
36 Policies.
37
- 38 Kringos, D. S., Boerma, W. G. W., Hutchinson, A., & Saltman, R. B. (Eds.). (2015b). *Building*
39 *primary care in a changing Europe: Case studies*. European Observatory on Health
40 Systems and Policies. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459010/>
41
- 42 Kroneman, M. (2011). *Paying general practitioners in Europe*. NIVEL Utrecht.
43
- 44 Lindseth, A., & Norberg, A. (2004). A phenomenological hermeneutical method for researching
45 lived experience. *Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences*, 18(2), 145–153.
46 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6712.2004.00258.x>
47
- 48 Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service*.
49 Russell Sage Foundation.
50
- 51 Lipsky, M. (2010). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services* (30th
52 anniversary expanded ed). Russell Sage Foundation.
53
- 54 Lora, A. (2009). An overview of the mental health system in Italy. *Ann Ist Super Sanita*, 45(1),
55 5–16.
56
- 57 Loyens, K. (2019). Networks as unit of analysis in street-level bureaucracy research. *Research*
58 *Handbook on Street-Level Bureaucracy*, 351–369.
59
60

- 1
2
3 Magliano, L., Punzo, R., Strino, A., Acone, R., Affuso, G., & Read, J. (2017). General
4 practitioners' beliefs about people with schizophrenia and whether they should be subject
5 to discriminatory treatment when in medical hospital: The mediating role of
6 dangerousness perception. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 87(5), 559–566.
7 <https://doi.org/10.1037/ort0000217>
8
- 9 Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2000). State Agent or Citizen Agent: Two Narratives of
10 Discretion. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10(2), 329–358.
11 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024272>
12
- 13 Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*.
14 sage.
15
- 16 Ministerio de Sanidad. Agencia Española de Medicamentos y Productos Sanitarios (AEMPS).
17 (2022). [https://www.aemps.gob.es/medicamentos-de-uso-humano/observatorio-de-uso-](https://www.aemps.gob.es/medicamentos-de-uso-humano/observatorio-de-uso-de-medicamentos)
18 [de-medicamentos](https://www.aemps.gob.es/medicamentos-de-uso-humano/observatorio-de-uso-de-medicamentos).
19
- 20 OECD. (2023). *Health spending* [dataset]. OECD. <https://doi.org/10.1787/8643de7e-en>
21
- 22 Pavolini, E., León, M., Guillén, A. M., & Ascoli, U. (2015). From austerity to permanent strain?
23 The EU and welfare state reform in Italy and Spain. *Comparative European Politics*,
24 13(1), 56–76. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.41>
25
- 26 Petmesidou, M., Guillén, A. M., & Pavolini, E. (2020). Health care in post-crisis South Europe:
27 Inequalities in access and reform trajectories. *Social Policy & Administration*, 54(5),
28 666–683. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12563>
29
- 30 Petmesidou, M., Pavolini, E., & Guillén, A. M. (2014). South European Healthcare Systems under
31 Harsh Austerity: A Progress–Regression Mix? *South European Society and Politics*,
32 19(3), 331–352. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.949994>
33
- 34 Reichert, A., & Jacobs, R. (2018). The impact of waiting time on patient outcomes: Evidence
35 from early intervention in psychosis services in England. *Health Economics*, 27(11),
36 1772–1787. <https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3800>
37
- 38 Roca, M., Gili, M., Garcia-Garcia, M., Salva, J., Vives, M., Garcia Campayo, J., & Comas, A.
39 (2009). Prevalence and comorbidity of common mental disorders in primary care.
40 *Journal of Affective Disorders*, 119(1–3), 52–58. Scopus.
41 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2009.03.014>
42
- 43 Salvador-Carulla, L., Tibaldi, G., Johnson, S., Scala, E., Romero, C., & Munizza, C. (2005).
44 Patterns of mental health service utilisation in Italy and Spain: An investigation using the
45 European Service Mapping Schedule. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology*,
46 40(2), 149–159. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-005-0860-y>
47
- 48 Serafini, G., Parmigiani, B., Amerio, A., Aguglia, A., Sher, L., & Amore, M. (2020). The
49 psychological impact of COVID-19 on the mental health in the general population. *QJM:*
50 *An International Journal of Medicine*, 113(8), 531–537.
51 <https://doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/hcaa201>
52
- 53 SISAC. (2009). *Accordo collettivo nazionale per la disciplina dei rapporti con i medici di*
54 *medicina generale*.
55 [https://www.sisac.info/aree/www.sisac.info/resources/MEDICINA_GENERALE/ACN](https://www.sisac.info/aree/www.sisac.info/resources/MEDICINA_GENERALE/ACN%2029%20luglio%202009/ACN_Medicina_Generale_consolidato%281%29.pdf)
56 [%2029%20luglio%202009/ACN_Medicina_Generale_consolidato%281%29.pdf](https://www.sisac.info/aree/www.sisac.info/resources/MEDICINA_GENERALE/ACN%2029%20luglio%202009/ACN_Medicina_Generale_consolidato%281%29.pdf)
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Thornicroft, G. (2008). Stigma and discrimination limit access to mental health care.
4 *Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale*, 17(1), 14–19.
5 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1121189X00002621>
6
- 7 van der Tier, M., Hermans, K., & Potting, M. (2021). Linking macro-level mechanisms to street-
8 level accountability practices. A cross-national case study of street-level accountability
9 of social workers in government funded homeless shelters. *Social Policy &*
10 *Administration*, 55(1), 191–205.
11
- 12 Vázquez-Barquero, J. L., García, J., & Torres-González, F. (2001). Spanish psychiatric reform:
13 What can be learned from two decades of experience? *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*,
14 104, 89–95.
15
- 16 Vu, T., Anderson, K. K., Somé, N. H., Thind, A., & Sarma, S. (2021). Mental Health Services
17 Provision in Primary Care and Emergency Department Settings: Analysis of Blended
18 Fee-for-Service and Blended Capitation Models in Ontario, Canada. *Administration and*
19 *Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, 48(4), 654–667.
20
- 21 Wells, J. S. (1997). Priorities, “street level bureaucracy” and the community mental health team.
22 *Health & Social Care in the Community*, 5(5), 333–342.
23
- 24 WHO. (1946). *Constitution of the World Health Organization*. Basic Documents. Geneva: World
25 Health Organization. <https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf>
26
- 27 WHO. (1978). *Declaration of alma-ata*. World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe.
28
- 29 WHO. (2013). *Government expenditures on mental health as a percentage of total government*
30 *expenditures on health (%)* [dataset].
31 [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/government-](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/government-expenditures-on-mental-health-as-a-percentage-of-total-government-expenditures-on-health-(-))
32 [expenditures-on-mental-health-as-a-percentage-of-total-government-expenditures-on-](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/government-expenditures-on-mental-health-as-a-percentage-of-total-government-expenditures-on-health-(-))
33 [health-\(-\)](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/government-expenditures-on-mental-health-as-a-percentage-of-total-government-expenditures-on-health-(-))
34
- 35 WHO. (2020). *Suicide worldwide in 2019 – Global health estimates*.
36 <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240026643>
37
- 38 Wilson, A., & Childs, S. (2002). The relationship between consultation length, process and
39 outcomes in general practice: A systematic review. *British Journal of General Practice*,
40 52(485), 1012–1020.
41
- 42 Wittchen, H. U., Jacobi, F., Rehm, J., Gustavsson, A., Svensson, M., Jönsson, B., Olesen, J.,
43 Allgulander, C., Alonso, J., Faravelli, C., Fratiglioni, L., Jennum, P., Lieb, R., Maercker,
44 A., van Os, J., Preisig, M., Salvador-Carulla, L., Simon, R., & Steinhausen, H.-C. (2011).
45 The size and burden of mental disorders and other disorders of the brain in Europe 2010.
46 *European Neuropsychopharmacology*, 21(9), 655–679.
47 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroneuro.2011.07.018>
48
- 49 Zuvekas, S. H., & Selden, T. M. (2010). Mental health and family out-of-pocket expenditure
50 burdens. *Medical Care Research and Review*, 67(2), 194–212.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60