

## Relevance of the Metaphysical Discussion Concerning Divine Sciences in Molina's Concordia and Báñez's Apology

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### Abstract

This paper argues the case for the actuality of the doctrine of two 16<sup>th</sup>-century Spanish scholastics, Luis de Molina and Domingo Báñez, which led to an important debate in the so-called *De auxiliis* Congregations. Said Congregations discussed how God lends his aid to men for them to act; thus divine omnipotence and omniscience can be compatible with human freedom. A brief summary of the positions held by the two protagonists of the discussion will be given in the first part of the paper. The second part is an attempt to uphold the actuality of this scholastic debate for today's philosophy of human sciences: we shall compare narrative history with the divine 'science of vision', and efficacious human techniques with God's 'middle science'.

**Keywords:** middle science, omniscience, divine sciences, science of vision, human techniques

### 1. The Problem of how to make Human Freedom and God's Omniscience and Omnipotence Compatible in late Spanish Scholasticism: Molina's *Concordia* and Báñez's *Apology*

This paper begins by evoking the controversy that took place in 16<sup>th</sup>-century Spain concerning the nature and number of the so-called 'divine sciences'. The debate took place in late scholastic theology, but goes back much earlier in history, from Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, through the Stoics, to Carneades of Cyrene, Priscillian, Peter Abelard, Wycliffe, St Augustine, St Anselm, St Thomas Aquinas, among others. Subsequently, this difficulty reappears in the work of Leibniz, in Spinoza's philosophy of freedom, in William James, etc., and continues to the present<sup>i</sup>. The problem, as outlined in Molina's *Concordia* and Báñez's *Apology*, is the antagonism between the efficaciousness of God's Grace (and His omnipotence) and the free will of human creatures, the antagonism between God's infallible decrees and man's will<sup>ii</sup>. Expressed in simpler terms: how is it possible for God to be omnipotent and omniscient, while man can be free? Francisco Suárez states: [...] two very opposed heresies must be assumed in this area. One is that of Pelagius, who denied the necessity of Grace, stating that, in order to save himself, it was sufficient for man to make use of the natural forces of free will and of his natural acts. The other heresy is that of Luther and Calvin, who stated, in contrast, that man had no freedom, as we only do what God makes us do, without having any power to resist Him, in both natural and supernatural matters, in both bad and good acts<sup>iii</sup>.

Creatures are 'secondary causes' and depend on God not only in their being, but also in their activity, because God has to assist them so they can act. Therefore, it is necessary to harmonize the freedom of secondary causes (creatures) to the infallibility and omnipotence of God's decrees. This problem raises many theological and moral issues concerning the nature of sin, evil and sublime acts; i.e., man's salvation and damnation. However, this paper shall not address these theological and moral issues, as we shall focus on the study of the epistemological structure of the problem: divine omniscience and divine sciences. Two opposing camps confronted one another in this debate. On one hand, the 'Molinists', who were mostly Jesuits, defended the existence of three divine sciences (the science of simple intelligence, the science of vision and the *scientia media*). On the other, the 'Bañecians', mainly Dominicans, spoke only of two sciences (denying *scientia media*) and defended the more orthodox Thomistic theory.

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This discussion led to the Jesuits confronting the Dominicans in a harsh, not merely academic controversy, in which tempers flared because the Dominicans were trying to counter the power that the Society of Jesus had been rapidly gaining. The controversy escalated until reaching Rome, where eighty-five boards or congregations were held between 1598 and 1607 (sixty-eight in the reign of Pope Clement VIII and seventeen in that of Pope Paul V). These meetings were called *De auxiliis* Congregations. For Bañecians, God knows free contingent futures, He knows the actions of men, and He even knows them in their smallest details (*usque ad minutissimas res*), because God's help cannot be '*pedisecua*', cannot follow in the wake of His creatures, His help has to go before them. Palacios de Terán stated in his defence of Báñez: God's gentleness means that He does not take away our free will when He actually move us, and God's strength implies that He will always get what He wants<sup>v</sup> As Sancho Davila once said, God moves all things: 'necessary things, necessarily, contingent things, contingently, and free things, freely'<sup>v</sup>. This is a typical Scholastic 'solution', which seems a purely *ad hoc* justification. Later on, we shall give some precise sense to these Scholastic formulas from the perspective of current philosophy. Some important differences between Báñez and Molina, as regards the general way of understanding the relationship between divine omnipotence and human freedom, could be summarized as follows. For Domingo Báñez, God's aid is interpreted as being prior to action, as being an '*unfrustrable*' (impossible to resist) 'physical pre-motion' which depends only on God's will. Hence, God has control over operations carried out by men, which are always subordinate to the First Cause. In Luis de Molina's doctrine, God's aid is interpreted as divine simultaneous assistance, *i.e.*, man is a partial cause to assist the First Cause, and from this mutual aid the result of human action is obtained. God's efficacious Grace is irresistible in Báñez's doctrine, while for Molina this Grace is only sufficient for there to be action, but does not determine the action. Thus, for Báñez, predestination predates man's action and has nothing to do with man's merits (this statement approximates Báñez's position to that of Luther's *De servo arbitrio*<sup>9</sup>), whereas for Molina, predestination is related to human merits.

For Domingo Báñez, the problem of how God unerringly determines free human acts implies an ontological mystery, while in the case of Molina's doctrine, this mystery is of a rather epistemological character as it means knowing what kind of science this 'divine science' is that makes it possible for God to have this 'super-understanding', this 'most eminent understanding', which allows Him to anticipate free future contingencies. Báñez's God is a pure inscrutable Act (which situates his theory very close to the cosmic antinomy: a Nature that progress on its own), while Molina's God is a personal God who interacts with men and is interested in them, like the God of religions. The Bañecian approach is rather a route downward (*processionism*), a God who is the First Cause and the cause of everything, while Molina's route would have some upward components (from men to God), as there is a recognition of the existence of free future contingencies and this existence is matched with God's existence through the concept of 'eminent understanding' to which we have already referred. Thomistic scholastics only admitted the existence of two divine sciences, the 'science of simple intelligence' and the 'science of vision'. By means of the first, God knows all possible worlds, all that is potentially given but which has not yet been brought up to date. This divine knowledge is prior to the free act of human will. Via the 'science of vision' or 'science of approval', God knows, among all possible things, those that have actually occurred: if by means of the 'science of simple intelligence' God could know as 'in the moment before creation', via the 'science of vision' God knows the world 'after the end of time', once everything has happened. As it is well known, Leibniz distinguished between truths of fact and truths of reason. By means of the 'science of vision', God knows things *a posteriori* 'according to our understanding', and this knowledge is given after the free act of human will.

Lying between these two sciences, Molina's solution is to introduce a 'middle science'. Francisco Suárez defines this science as follows:

As if I had such an understanding of Peter's condition and his willingness that I knew that if I should ask him for something in such a way and at such a time when he is so disposed, then Peter would usually satisfy me, while asking him for it in another situation, although he might do so, I know he would not satisfy me. In which case, the fact that I should choose to ask such a thing in some circumstance or other depends solely on me, and so my will influences whether I achieve what I desire. Even so, it makes no difference whether I do anything else with respect to Peter if I make this request at one time or another or, at least, I do not cease to do what is necessary to achieve the effect<sup>vii</sup> This 'middle science' is about knowing what a created free will, an operative individual, would or would not do given certain conditions. There is, therefore, an operative co-determination between God and creatures that is characteristic of 'simultaneous aid': this is what is known as conditional futures (*futuribilia*), which are contingent futures that will take place given certain conditions. This 'middle science' precedes the free act of human will.

This discussion concerning divine omniscience and its harmony with human freedom is given in a theological context in which the arguments are incomprehensible when posited from the perspective of a philosophy that does not share the dogmas of revelation. Scholastic theology concerning Grace and free will is full of 'solutions' that are purely verbal, as when scholastics state that the action of free will can be 'in itself' (*'simpliciter'*, with absolute necessity or *'consequent'* necessity) contingent, *i.e.*, free, and 'for other reasons' (*'secundum quid'*, for relative necessity or necessity 'of consequence') necessary, because of divine motion. When they refer to divine sciences, these could be dissociated 'according to our understanding', but if they are considered 'in God', the divine sciences (whether two or three) are inseparable: God is installed in eternity, and as Boethius states, eternity is *'interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio'* ('possession, without succession and perfect, of interminable life'<sup>viii</sup>). If so, it is not possible to understand what it may mean for God to know in prior or subsequent time as regards human will, because that 'before' and 'after' is only 'for us' and is meaningless when we speak about God. Báñez reminds us of this explicitly: the distinction between divine sciences is not formally in God, but only from the different analogies with gotten things<sup>ix</sup>. This is the central point of the interpretation to be made next, because, if the distinction of divine sciences is made from these different analogies with gotten things, then its source must be in certain human disciplines. It is, therefore, legitimate to ask what existing sciences or disciplines the scholastics were observing when they distinguished, 'by analogy', the three divine sciences.

## **2. Relevance of the Discussion Concerning Divine Sciences for a Current Philosophy of Human Sciences. Narrative History as 'Science of Vision' and Human Techniques as 'Middle Science'**

In 1989, the Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno made a comparison between the different operative states of human sciences and the scholastic theory of divine sciences<sup>x</sup>. What in the scholastic doctrine constituted the conflict between human freedom and divine omniscience and omnipotence, in the human sciences would be the conflict between the operative capacity of studied subjects and the claim of such sciences to account for these operations and, ultimately, to predict them. Here we shall develop this comparison in a direction that is compatible with the philosophy of Bueno. The general context of this comparison remains: When we deal with divine sciences, the omniscience of God allows Him to predict what men will do, given certain circumstances, without sacrificing their freedom. When we deal with human sciences, human freedom is opposed to the claim of human sciences to be deterministic, predictive sciences. The goal of such human sciences is to account for the operations of the subject. Thus there also arises, within this context, the problem of the incompatibility of determinism (that of such sciences and not that of God) and the free will of the studied subjects. From the viewpoint of a philological history of philosophy, it may seem irrelevant, even anachronistic, to refer to current human sciences when interpreting a scholastic controversy of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Conversely, from a positivist standpoint, it could well be considered suspicious that the analysis of divine sciences might contribute something of interest to the philosophy of present-day human sciences.

From a philosophical history of philosophy standpoint, however, this coordination among divine sciences and human sciences can make sense: first, in order to understand what sources these divine sciences are taken from; second, in order to detect certain metaphysical structures embedded in current human sciences that are heir to these theological ideas and which could be acting in an unseen way. First of all, it should be stressed that the terms 'human sciences' and 'human techniques' suffer from an ambiguity that needs to be cleared up. From an etiological (causal) viewpoint, all sciences, even natural sciences, are 'human' sciences; *i.e.*, they are sciences made by men. From the perspective of pluralist ontology, we do not recognize the existence of divine sciences. The same applies to techniques that are also the product of human activity. However, from a thematic point of view, the expression 'human sciences' is used to refer to those sciences that seek to review the operations of human subjects (or certain animals). We likewise use the expression 'human techniques' (in a thematic sense) to refer to those techniques that seek to determine or intervene in the operations of other individuals; *e.g.*, techniques of behaviour modification (*'psychagogic'* techniques) or of social control (rhetorical techniques, propaganda, persuasion and so on). Having made this clarification, we shall now attempt to establish the relationship between the divine sciences of scholasticism and current sciences and techniques. The 'science of simple intelligence' may be compared to the formal sciences and natural sciences, which are the sciences of all possible worlds (non-Euclidean and n-dimensional geometries, past worlds). They are also necessary, deterministic sciences (physics, biology, neuroscience, genetic).

In the fields of human sciences, we can find this deterministic approach in sociobiology, behavioural genetics, neuropsychology, historical materialism, cultural materialism, behaviourism, and so on. In these approaches, the operations of men are determined by non-operative factors, be they biological (genetic, neurological, etc.) in character, or be they certain factors that are external to the subject (cultural factors, social class, historical moment, etc.). 'Free science' or the 'science of vision' may be compared to the narrative history: said history, obtained from relics and documents, draws a narrative of past events. This historical science is like God's science of vision when He sees men from the viewpoint of the consummation of the centuries. After the conclusion of events, historians occupy a similar perspective to God's point of view. 'The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk': once the end of the Roman Empire, the fall of the Nazi empire or the failure of the Soviet empire is known, historians can begin their work. The historian, as a god, knows the results of human actions, so his knowledge is a kind of 'science of vision' (retrospective). Molina's 'middle science' would be situated between the science of necessity and possibility (natural and formal sciences) and the 'science of vision' which is *ex post facto* science, when the subject's operations and its results are already known. At present, in order to understand the meaning of Molina's middle science, the canonical situation could be provided by the game of chess. Chess is a game that, so far, has no purely mathematical solution. The game must be played every time, and, in the course of the game, there is a mutual determination of the operations of the two players. Still, we must recognize that some people have the 'science of chess'.

But what kind of science is this 'science'? It is a knowledge within which the winning player can predict what his opponent will do, given certain conditions. And this is precisely the characterization of 'middle science'. We can assert that chess could be the canon of human (efficacious) techniques: *i.e.*, techniques that give us an ability to manipulate the operations of other individuals. In the game of chess, the losing subject gives the appearance of playing, he gives the appearance of moving his parts freely, though, in fact, his game is being determined *in media res* by the winner, because the loser's strategy is enveloped by the more powerful strategy of the winner. Similarly, the buyer thinks he is freely choosing a given product, when, in fact, he is being determined by the 'victorious advertiser' who is able to direct his operations. In the same way, someone hearing a speech can be swayed by the persuasive speaker. These are human techniques, techniques of propaganda, of persuasion, of behaviour modification, of economic or political manipulation, each of which has its own specificity and has to prove its efficaciousness. So, on the one hand, we have the History (empirical science) as regards what has actually occurred 'after approval by divine will'. In this science, past operations are reconstructed from relics and documents. On the other hand, we have the natural sciences. Between these natural sciences and the 'science of vision', we can recognize what the Molinists called the 'middle sciences', which would be our current human techniques when these are efficacious. When they proposed, by analogy, the existence of divine sciences, the scholastics would have been inspired by certain sciences and human disciplines. The source of the divine 'science of vision' would have been history (forensic history, sacred history); the source of the 'science of simple intelligence' would have been geometry, mathematics, the sciences of necessity and possibility; while, finally, the source of Molina's 'middle science' would have been efficacious human techniques, the techniques of persuasion and propaganda, or the *psychagogical* techniques of spiritual advisers (who can be seen as the forbearers of our clinical psychologists). If a human is able to lead or persuade another, God is able to do much more with His middle science, which implies a very eminent super-understanding. For the non-believer, theological ideas cannot arise from nothing, nor can they come from the transcendent, but must be taken, by analogy, from the immanence of the world.

In the 'simple intelligence science', individual operations are explained as if they were phenomena that depend on non-operative factors. In the 'science of vision', the historian reconstructs operations from bygone relics and documents. Finally, in 'middle science', operations of another subject could be co-determined, because, knowing what said individual will do, given certain circumstances, we are able to gently guide him along. The antinomy of freedom is neither given between human praxis and cosmic causality (as in Kant's third antinomy), nor between human praxis and divine causality (as in the scholastic discussions being addressed here), but between human praxis and human praxis: hence the interest of the epistemological, not metaphysical, interpretation of 'middle science' as current efficacious human techniques. From this perspective, it is possible to understand the present as if it were determined by the past in the following way: our plans could be subordinated to those of individuals who came before us in centuries, and the praxis of these past individuals could be responsible for current cultural norms.

This historical interpretation implies understanding the theological disputes concerning the sciences of God in light of the different methodologies used in human sciences in such a way that these divine sciences should be interpreted as metaphysical hypostases of the (more or less scientific) human disciplines that currently exist: the 'science of vision' as a hypostasis of narrative history (the history that the 16<sup>th</sup>-century Spanish scholastics had before them) and universal history (F. Schlegel: the historian is like a 'prophet in reverse'); 'simple intelligence science' as a hypostasis of formal and natural sciences; and 'middle science' as a hypostasis of the techniques of managing and determining human praxis (teaching techniques, persuasion techniques, strategy and so on). Now, if we do not wish to fall into historicist reductionism that sees theology as a mere superstructure without any capacity to shape (past and present) reality, it will be necessary to explore the reciprocal influence, the determining influence of theological ideas about our philosophy of human sciences and, of course, about historical categories themselves. The idea of 'simple intelligence science', a science of the necessary and possible, would underlie the (Lutheran) theological lineage of extreme determinism, a theory that we find in Thomas Huxley and William James' idea of 'conscious automata'. For Huxley, volition is the impression that comes when the idea of temporal action is accompanied by the desire for performed action<sup>xi</sup>. Consciousness is simply what comes with the necessary actions of men. As Spinoza put it in a famous letter to Schuller:

Next conceive if you please that the stone, while it continues in motion, thinks and knows that it is striving to continue in motion. Surely this stone in as much as it is conscious only of its own effort will believe that it is completely free and that it continues in motion for no other reason than because it wants to. And such is the human freedom which all men boast that they possess and which consists solely in this: that men are conscious of their desires and are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. So the infant believes that it freely wants milk; the boy when he is angry that he freely wants revenge; the timid that he wants to escape (...). So the delirious, the garrulous and many others of the same sort, believe that they are acting in accordance with the free decision of their mind, and not that they are carried away by impulse.<sup>xii</sup> As stated above, Báñez did not support the existence of 'middle science'; he considered that God moves us gently, without taking away our freedom, but always according to His designs. So, 'simple intelligence science' is sufficient for God to know the operations of men. When culture determines the individual from the outside, it looks like this Bañecian God, moving men gently: the individual who assumes (social, cultural, historical) rules acts freely, though in a culturally determined way. The coexistence of the free act of will and the determination of the individual from the outside is thus possible. The determination of a subject's operations by the rules of a given culture, when the individual endorses these standards, allows for a positive interpretation of Bañecian theory that posits the compatibility between human freedom and 'divine omnipotence'. The cultural environment of an individual, like the God of Báñez, is able to move man 'gently' but, at the same time, firmly when the individual acts on the assumption of these rules, and thus determines him without denying him his freedom.

In his *Metaphysics* (book lambda), Aristotle likened the cosmos to a family in which the stars –which are moving in a completely regular, determined way– are compared with free men, and the slaves –who act according to their whims and who are not guided by reason– are compared to irregular, imperfect movements. In Thomistic scholasticism, freedom only exists when it seeks the realization of the purpose of beatitude. Skinner's theory, in which freedom appears as a case of operant behaviour could be understood this way: a subject's operant behaviour is determined from outside, and yet the individual is free (in his way)<sup>xiii</sup>. As regards Molina's 'middle science', the following comments could be made. After discarding the theological idea of an infinite operating subject (God) who controls the field in a total way, the 'open' character of operation control techniques is thus revealed. These techniques will always be problematic because there exists no individual who could completely dominate the entire field. If this were so, any political theory that states the existence of an individual subject who dominates the operative political field (for instance, the leader of a superpower) would be idealistic. When we refer to the 'science of vision', we see the influence of theological ideas on certain ideas from history. We should ask ourselves to what extent certain common ideas in history and philosophy of history continue to have the same metaphysical theological format as the ideas of late Spanish scholastics. For instance, the goal of a scientific history which could make predictions could be considered reminiscent of divine omniscience of the 'science of vision'.

The projects of making a 'universal history', a 'history of humanity', or a 'biography of humanity' also carry the metaphysical, theological idea of omniscience (Schiller; Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* said: '*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*'; i.e., 'Universal History is the Last Judgement'). Furthermore, these components could be recognized in all theological metaphysical theories that conceive of an 'end state' (Kant, Hegel, Marx or Fukuyama). Deterministic interpretations of history continually run the risk of conceiving past events as a necessity when, in the field of historical action, some of them were, in fact, the result of risks and contingencies and their contingent composition. There is a danger in justifying what has happened as necessity, from a historical point of view, thereby overlooking the fact that historical reality is a result that was not designed by any omniscient, omnipotent individual. If we assume this deterministic history, any rational calculation that tries to exert some influence on reality through political action will be rendered meaningless. The idea of world history or the history of mankind recalls God's viewpoint after the end of time, a point of view referred to when discussing the 'science of vision'. Total, universal history is impossible as a science, when this is understood as a discipline that is able to account for everything that has happened, one that is able to account for the entire development of mankind. This comparison also reminds us that, since God's point of view does not exist, then neutral universal history, a history made 'from nowhere', is not possible because history is always constructed from a given part of humanity (for instance, it is made from an empire or a 'catholic' organization that tries to accomplish a universal project).

## Epilogue

The theological problem of the relationship between human freedom and divine omniscience could be seen as the ancestor of the philosophical problem of the relationship between human freedom and scientific determinism. Hence, if we omit its historical metaphysical framework, the study of the theological debate as it took place among the late Spanish scholastics can be useful in understanding some of the problems of current human sciences and techniques. As has become clear, the proposed interpretation concerning *De auxiliis* disputes does not intend to side with the Bañecian interpretation, as we also uphold the important role of Molina's middle science (though in a specific sense, considered as efficacious human techniques). Nor do we disregard the fact that other interpretations are possible. It should not be forgotten that the Catholic Church itself (holy, ancient, illuminated by the Holy Spirit), by the hand of Pope Paul V, on the advice of the Bishop of Geneva, San Francisco of Sales, eventually put an end to the Roman *De auxiliis* Congregations, suspended the trial, and strictly forbade the contestants to emit theological censures.

<sup>i</sup> Marcelino Ocaña undertakes a historical overview of the antecedents and consequences of the discussion about freedom in Christian scholasticism. See: Marcelino Ocaña, *Molinismo y libertad* (Molinism and Freedom), (Córdoba, Cajasur, 2000).

<sup>ii</sup> Luis de Molina, *Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratia Donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione*, Concordia, 1589. original Latin version Madrid, Societatis Iesu, 1953. (Spanish translation: *Concordia del libre arbitrio con los dones de la gracia y con la presciencia, providencia, predestinación y reprobación divinas*, Oviedo, Pentalfa, 2007). On line Spanish version: <http://www.fgbueno.es/edi/bfe012.htm>

Domingo Báñez, *Apología*, original Latin version in Beltrán de Heredia, *Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia. Textos y documentos* (Domingo Báñez and the Controversies about Grace. Texts and Documents) (Madrid, CSIC, 1968) 115-381. (Spanish translation: *Apología de los hermanos dominicos contra la Concordia de Luis de Molina*, Oviedo, Pentalfa, 2002)

<sup>iii</sup> Francisco Suárez, *En defensa de la compañía cerca del libre arbitrio*, Madrid: 1594 in Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, op. cit. 418. '[...] se ha de suponer dos herejías encontradas por extremo en esta materia. La una es de Pelagio, que negaba la necesidad de la gracia, diciendo que para salvarnos bastaban las fuerzas naturales del libre albedrío y sus actos naturales. La otra es de Lutero y Calvino, que al contrario dijeron no haber en nosotros libertad alguna, sino que hacemos solamente aquello que Dios nos hace obrar, sin le poder resistir, así en lo natural como en lo sobrenatural, y así en lo malo como en lo bueno'

<sup>iv</sup> El Dr. Palacios de Terán al consejo acerca de la prohibición de disputar impuesta por Su Santidad, Salamanca, 20 de Septiembre, 1594: 'Y en no quitarnos nuestro libre albedrío cuando eficazmente nos mueve, está la suavidad; y en que salga Dios con lo que quiere está la fortaleza' (in Beltrán de Heredia, op. cit. 663)

<sup>v</sup> Sancho Davila, *Parecer de don Sancho Davila, Obispo de Cartagena, sobre la doctrina de los padres Domingo Báñez y Francisco Zúmel acerca de los auxilios de la gracia y libre albedrío*, 1594, in Beltrán de Heredia, op. cit. 477, 484.

<sup>vi</sup> 'Sequitur nunc, liberum arbitrium esse plane divinum nomen, nec ulli posse competere quam soli divinae maiestate. Quod si hominibus tribuitur, nihilo rectius tribuitur, quam si divinitas quoque ipsa eis tribueretur, quo sacrilegio nullum esse maius possit'. 'It now then follows, that Free-will is plainly a divine term, and can be applicable to none but the divine Majesty only [...] Whereas, if it be ascribed unto men, it is not more properly ascribed, than the divinity of God Himself would be ascribed unto them: which would be the greatest of all sacrilege'. Martin Luther, *De servo arbitrio*, t.III, fol. 177v-178 (WA 18, 636-637).

<sup>vii</sup> Francisco Suárez, *En defensa de la compañía cerca del libre arbitrio*, Madrid: 1594 in Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, op.cit. 423: 'Como si yo tuviese tanta comprensión de la condición y voluntad de Pedro que supiese que rogándole una cosa en tal hora y en tal sazón en que suele estar contento la hará, y rogándosela en otra coyuntura, aunque la podría hacer, sé que no la hará. En tal

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caso, elegir yo el pedírsela en una sazón o en la otra depende de mi solo querer y hace mucho para que lo que se pretende con efecto se consiga o no. Y, con todo eso, yo no hago más acerca de Pedro porque se la pida a una hora o a otra o al menos no dejo de hacer cosa de las necesarias para que se consiga el efecto'

viii Boethius, *De consolatione philosophia*, V, 6 (Consolation of Philosophy) ca. 520 aC. On line English version: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14328/14328-h/14328-h.htm>

ix 'Superfluum existimamus explicare in hoc loco quomodo distinctio duplicis scientiae praedictae non sumatur ex parte distinctionis formalis quae in Deo sit, sed solummodo per distinctas comparationes ad res scitas, quae comparatio in ipso Deo relatio rationis est'. 'It is superfluous to explain here how the double distinction of science mentioned above is not taken from the formal distinction as it is found in God, but only from the different analogies to known things, thanks to which we can talk about this distinction in God'. Domingo Báñez, *Apología*, op. cit.: 116

x Gustavo Bueno, 'Sobre el alcance de una "ciencia media" (ciencia  $\beta_1$ ) entre las ciencias humanas estrictas (ciencias  $\alpha_2$ ) y los saberes prácticos positivos ( $\beta_2$ )', *El Basilisco* 2 (1989): 57-73. On line Spanish version: <http://www.fgbueno.es/med/dig/meta89g.pdf>

See also: Gustavo Bueno, 'Libertad y "ciencia media"', in *El sentido de la vida*, (Oviedo, Pentalfa, 1996), 304-330.

xi Thomas Huxley, *Hume* (London, Macmillan, 1879), 184, 191, 192

On line English version:

[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18819/18819-h/18819-h.htm#CHAPTER\\_XI](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18819/18819-h/18819-h.htm#CHAPTER_XI)

William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890 (Dover Publications, 1950). On line English version:

<http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/>

xii Baruch Spinoza, Letter to G.H. Schuller, October 1674.

xiii Burrhus Frederic Skinner, *Walden Two*, 1948. (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2005)

Burrhus Frederic Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, 1971. (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2002)