

DOC. 130/97

RODOLFO GUTIERREZ

INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN HUMAM
RESOURCE PRACTICES: EVIDENCE FROM THREE
CASE STUDIES

**Individualism and collectivism in human resource practices:
Evidence from three case studies**

Rodolfo Gutiérrez
Area de Sociología
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Universidad de Oviedo
33071 Oviedo
rgutier@hp845.econo.uniovi.es

This paper is part of a work-in-progress research (PB-CYR95-02) funded by Fundación para la Investigación Científica y la Tecnología (FICYT) of Asturias (Spain) and carried out with the assistance of Holm D. Köhler. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Research Seminar "Work, Organizations and Markets" of the Department of Sociology and the Harvard Business School at Harvard University.

ABSTRACT

A set of observations that emerged from previous projects on industrial change and on initial work trajectories in Spain have encouraged me to carry out case-based research on employment models and human resource management practices. In this research paper, I analyse the variety of employment models in a European industrial context and how that variety can determine new human resources practices, particularly those directed towards new personnel staffing (recruitment, selection, training and promotion). Most of the U.S. literature on new human resources practices rests on integral and stable types of these practices, resulting primarily from management strategic options that are congruent with employment models oriented toward individualism. I present the results of three case analyses of firms and I aim to show that, in certain contexts, the collective dimension is crucial to understand the variety of new employment models. I also demonstrate that the collective dimension influences types of human resource practices, and that these types are slightly integrated and unstable configurations.

1. INTRODUCTION

My previous research focused on industrial change in early industrialisation contexts, in their double dimension of de-industrialisation and of re-industrialisation (García-Blanco and Gutiérrez 1989, Gutiérrez 1992). These research projects showed that one of the most relevant features of territories experiencing long industrial decline, and one of the strongest barriers to the reversion of those processes is the shortage of firms with a high propensity to organizational innovation. Specifically, in these territories, the capacity for organizational innovation proved itself more crucial than the access to financial or technological resources, since the former determines the typical way in which changes in the product markets are faced by the firms: either through the capacity to innovate their products and their productive processes, with the consequent material and human resources flexibility, or through the inflexibility of productive structures that solve all the changes in the markets by reducing the output, and with the consequent industrial adjustment. As opposed to this diagnosis on industrial change, the main economic agents' perspective, in these regional contexts, share a somewhat different outlook: our firms, these agents assert, have good human resources, either

managers, or technicians and workers; our managers know the bulk of innovative management techniques, yet the labor relations institutions, mainly the collective centralised bargaining structure and the control of the work council by unions, pose an insurmountable barrier to organizational innovation.

It is easy to see the ideological aspects in this perspective: the attribution of all evils of the “industrial disorder” to the collective institutions of labor relations is almost commensurate with managerial philosophies. In the beginning, we did not pay much attention to this observation and we defined it as part of an “industrial culture of decline”, in which all the economic agents granted the institutional context an overwhelming role and perceived in a fatalistic way the opportunities for industrial change (Gutiérrez 1992). Subsequent studies allowed us to further improve on that diagnosis, and to conclude that, in addition to legitimisation of the decline, entrepreneurs and managers were warning of a real problem: how problematic it was to combine new work management techniques with the institutions and practices of the collective labor relations (Castells et al. 1994): businessmen and managers were clearly perceiving the need to introduce new work management techniques since they were involved in markets and with technologies in which these type of signals are constantly being sent forth. In most of the cases, managers and businessmen had access to the technical knowledge of some of those management techniques (i.e. TQM, teamwork), but encountered barriers to their implementation in their own firms.

In a most theoretical sense, the contrast between the scarce capacity that the managers assigned to themselves regarding the introduction of work management innovation and the privileged role that the academic literature on HRM grants them turned out to be interesting. This contrast between the manager’s self-image and the academic view encouraged us to proceed with this research.

Another part of my research, the most recent one, has dealt with studying the entry to work trajectories. From the mid-80’s onward, intensive labor market deregulation is taking place in Spain. The core of that process has been the liberalisation of the labor contracting modalities. The need of promoting youth employment, in addition to the reluctance to change the legal configuration of the conventional labor contract (permanent duration and high layoff costs), has led successive legal reforms multiplying the labor contract modalities (i.e. temporary, apprenticeship, in-practice, etc.). These reforms have created a legal framework that allows firms to employ young people (even

those aged 28-30 years) regardless of contract duration and salary, and resulting in a deep labor market segmentation by age: most of the young people entering the labor market from the mid-80's onwards have temporary contracts and are kept out of collective bargaining regulation.

In such a context, firms have more employment relations choices and a greater variety of initial work trajectories than should be commonly expected. Nevertheless, follow-up research, using event history analysis on a longitudinal data set of a sample of 20-29-year-old individuals, did not confirm the expectation of a greater variation in these initial trajectories (García-Blanco and Gutiérrez 1995 and 1996). Leaning on well-known work by Spilerman (1977), our conclusions were that: a) professional trajectories were very uncommon and limited almost exclusively to managerial occupations; b) ordinate trajectories were also infrequent, in spite of having been traditionally dominant in the skilled-manual and non-manual segments of Spanish labor market, and were restricted to the public sector; and c) a sort of chaotic trajectories, characterised by successive entries to and exits from employment and by low grade and salary promotion, was much more frequent than the employment systems to which they are supposedly related. However, most of the chaotic ones fit into a different pattern. On the one hand, they were not showing a clear relationship with either firm size or with occupational level, since they were present both in medium size and large firms and in different skill segments (manual and non-manual). On the other hand, the longer work experience does not universally favour the ending of the chaotic path, this depending on the timing of that experience. In other words, the beginning of a most ordinate job trajectory is only favoured by time accumulation with short periods of unemployment events, and is otherwise not favoured by long unemployment periods, even if few.

Those results showed that the variety of employment relations, in a context as the one described, was not well captured by the classic distinction between internal and occupational markets. The variables usually associated with the internal markets configuration and ordinate trajectories (company size, industrial sector, occupational level and temporary or indefinite character of the labor contract) did not have this sort of influence. The research on industrial decline pointed at the cognitive map of employment models to be an important barrier to organizational innovation. Both of these research results called for theoretical analysis on the underlying structure of employment models and for qualitative data analysis.

2. MODELS OF EMPLOYMENT: INDIVIDUALIST AND COLLECTIVIST DIMENSIONS

The literature most concerned with recent changes in work management forms has the strategic management of the human resources (HRM) as its main focus topic. The HRM approach seeks to obtain a competitive advantage through a strategic mobilisation of personnel; more precisely, through developing a highly-skilled and committed workforce, and displaying congruent cultural settings (organizational culture), structural intervention (organizational and work design) and personnel management techniques (Storey 1995). This literature tends to link the character and the diffusion of these practices, mainly, to two types of factors: firstly, the competitive pressure of the markets, that compels the firms to combine technological change with a continuous improvement of productivity; secondly, the existence of a corporate identity, something which has to do with the strategic capacity of managers and their "styles" or "visions" of work management.

The literature on HRM normally emphasises the influence of these two types of factors, so that the different models of HRM are always "best way" options, linked either to excellence situations (Beer et al. 1985), or to other contingent factors, such as the firm competitive strategy and the life cycle of markets and products (Storey and Sisson 1993). However, there is great distance between the alleged strategic and coherent nature of these models and the empirical evidence showing the lack of a clear HRM strategy in most firms and the much more pragmatic and eclectic way of introducing these practices (Storey and Sisson 1993). Hence, other factors are to be taken into account for a more accurate typology of employment models and their influence on the configuration of HRM practices.

The neglect of the collective dimension of employment models is an especially unsatisfactory aspect of this literature. The new HRM models hardly say anything about representation institutions and collective bargaining and they have been shaped by the experience of United States, where it has been identified a trend toward industrial relations without collective bargaining (Kochan, Katz and MacKersie 1986) and where the adoption of HRM techniques, as a key element of sophisticated union avoidance strategies, is much more widespread. For this reason, in the European academic context, the HRM anglo-saxon versions are received as an alternative to traditional models of industrial relations, the argument being that the raising interest in HRM throughout the

1980s coincided with a steady decline of trade unions membership and their spill-over effects, in the sense that unions become irrelevant as soon as a high organizational commitment is sought by HRM practices. It is not surprising that HRM terminology is much more frequently used in Spain or in France, where trade unions are much more weaker, than in Germany or in Italy, countries with a stronger collective tradition of labor relations. A recent review of empirical studies on the HRM diffusion concludes that those changes involve a superficial and ideological philosophy of interest harmony that would permit more sophisticated techniques of work control and subordination. Such managerial philosophy, basically a reflection of socio-political changes, will hardly create a unitary firm culture capable of surviving in the long run (Legge 1995).

In a certain manner, those criticisms assume that the American model of HRM is a universal model. However, the American experience has to be considered exceptional, because the legal framework of union certification and bargaining rights creates a sharp difference between unionised and non-unionised firms, and the employers tend to adopt an all-or-nothing policy toward collective bargaining. Thus, in Europe, in spite of the generalized decline of centralized collective bargaining and of union militancy, with statutory rights for employee representation, the employers' advantages of union exclusion are fewer, and the obstacles to a frontal attack on entrenched union organization are far greater than in America. Unilateral imposition of major changes in workplace organization and practices is virtually impossible without the participation, or at least the consent, of the employees representation bodies. Hence, in the European context, strategic options for management have typically been more complex and contradictory. The patterns of employer actions do not match unproblematically HRM recipes, and their outcomes are "hybrid" arrangements characterised by the interplay of market forces and institutionalized compromises where trade unions still have an important role (Hyman 1994a).

This "hybrid" character could be one of the definite features of the recent evolution of the European employment models. However, it is unclear what the key factors producing that hybrid character are and what adaptations of new HRM practices are brought about as a result. In this paper, I assume that these key factors are: on the one hand, the strategic management choice capacity and the correspondent work philosophies (visions, styles, cultures); and on the other hand, the type of influence created by a collective context of labor relations. Other authors, leaning on Fox's (1971

and 1974) dichotomy of pluralistic and unitaristic management styles, have made a promising typology of employment models (Purcell 1987; Purcell and Ahsstrand 1994). This proposal, scarcely empirically explored, identifies two axis, *individualism* and *collectivism*, understood as the two basic and separated dimensions in the configuration of employment models (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Employment models matrix

		COLLECTIVISM		
		Unitary None	Adversarial	Pluralist Cooperative
INDIVIDUALISM	Employee development	sophisticated human relations	???	sophisticated consultative
	Paternalism	paternalist	bargained constitutional	modern paternalist
	Cost minimization	traditional		???

Although this proposal was built as a matrix to differentiate management styles, a broader reading of it is possible as a typology of employment models. Management styles find their specific place on the vertical axis (named *individualism*), defining a work philosophy and a set of strategic preferences in personnel management. On its turn, the horizontal axis (named *collectivism*) represents an institutional component which is beyond the managers scope. The collective dimension is a cultural and institutional crystallization of internal characteristics of the firm (representation structures and trust patterns between management and employees) and other external influences (collective bargaining structures, trade union strategies and labor relations cultures).

The first of these axes refers to the basic way the firm perceives and deals with its personnel as individuals. It focuses on the management perspectives on the way jobs

should be designed, contracts established, people rewarded and whether or not training and development of employees should be undertaken. From the bottom to the top of the individualism scale, we find organizations that view their employees on three different levels: a) as a homogenous whole, a commodity to be bought from the external labor market and unable to distinguish individuals and individual performance (cost minimization); b) as assets with a strong potential for effort and loyalty than can be obtained as long as some of their specific needs are satisfied, and a sense of community and generosity on benefits and pay levels is provided (paternalism); and c) as a resource with aspirations and competencies of their own that has to be developed and motivated through training, pay schemes and promotion patterns (employee development).

These three types of HRM styles can be observed through qualitative methods, since they are straightforwardly spoken out by the managers when asked about their personnel. Terms such as “manpower”, “cost”, “discipline”, “firmness”, “effectiveness”, “productivity”, “strong management”, “performance” are more akin to cost minimization styles; paternalist styles are more likely to use words such as “asset”, “family”, “loyalty”, “satisfaction”, “needs”, “welfare”, “humane”, “paternal”, “benevolent”; whereas “resource”, “skills”, “commitment”, “development”, “learning”, “participation”, “team” are the words used under employment development styles.

The second axis expresses the institutional dimension of the employment relation. Regardless of the vision of their personnel as individuals, organizations and managers must either avoid or recognize unions and other forms of employee representation. From the left to the right of the collectivism scale, we have three other types of firm orientation: a) deliberate avoidance of any attempt to articulate and integrate individual interests in a collective whole (unitary); b) long-established relationship with trade unions but in a mainly conflictive nature (adversarial); and c) not only the recognition of the legitimacy of employee representation but active support of consultation and participation channels (cooperative).

A short description of each box on the matrix can be given. In *sophisticated human relations* firms, the key issues are to assess, develop and recognize each employee's competencies and contributions in a way that makes unionization unnecessary. The *paternalist* type includes firms that look after employees by providing a reasonable pay and fringe benefits, by projecting a caring image and by avoiding collective conflicts and unionization through an intense individual and downward

communication. The *traditional* type can be found in firms where labor costs are all-important and their main goal is to minimize the expenses attached to recruitment, hiring and training; high labor turnover and temporary or part-time contract make it easy to avoid union membership and collective bargaining. The *bargained constitutional* is the largest category covering firms where unions have been recognized for some time but managers see them as a permanent constraint; here personnel policies are developed around the need to achieve conflict stability, bargaining very specific collective agreements and administering them at the workplace. Variations of paternalism and cost minimization in this type are related to a more or less accommodated patterns of relationships with representative bodies, which requires some sort of company “generosity” in wages and benefits. The *modern paternalist* describes a type of organization which combines a caring welfare image with an aim to achieve a “constructive” relationship with trade unions; here job categories and pay structures are the key conditions to create a feeling of fairness. The *sophisticated consultative* firms add to the sophisticated human relations approach an active encouragement of new forms of employee representation either through the protection of work councils or through a reformed collective bargaining machinery. The empty boxes of the matrix (with question marks in them) refer to configurations inherently unstable and unlikely to last for long. A firm basing its policies on a cost minimization strategy will not find a stable and highly cooperative behavior from the employee representation bodies (the bottom-right-hand box), and adversarial relationships with recognized unions is not commensurate with principles of employee development (the top-center box).

The employment models matrix has been criticized on several grounds. The lack of accuracy of basic concepts has resulted problematic, for instance, collectivism and paternalism. Thus, it is claimed that there are forms of collectivism, as the teamwork, that can be totally detached from the collective representation structures (Storey and Bacon 1993) or that paternalism is a historically valuable configuration but improper category to capture current employment relations (Marchington and Parker 1990). However, these criticisms do not affect the main argument, that is, the two existing separated dimensions in the employment models configuration. Furthermore, the problem of accuracy in each of the matrix types is a secondary concern since this matrix should not be considered as a static model. The goal is not to prove that every firm’s situations in a given moment perfectly matches any of the matrix boxes, rather whether this matrix

is a useful tool for plotting strategic choices in HRM and capturing movements to specific sets of practices.

These types of employment models supposedly influence the set of HRM practices available to the firm when staffing new employees. Consequently, these practices help to shape initial work trajectories. Most of the so-called new HRM practices are addressed to the employees provision sphere, being the most strongly emphasized HRM practices the following: the increasingly higher requirements for recruitment and selection, the extension of training and the introduction of variable pay schemes and career planning. In a certain way, this is the set of practices corresponding to what is termed *sophisticated human relations* model. But here we do not raise specific hypotheses about the relationship among employment models, staffing practices and initial trajectories. Due to the exploratory nature and the case-study methodology, it seems advisable to maintain the expectation of several sets of HRM practices being feasible and, above all, that these sets are contingent upon employment models.

3. METHOD

These empirical and theoretical concerns prompted an exploratory research based on firm cases studies, in order to directly observe their HRM practices, mainly those regarding new staffing. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the main goal of these case studies is not just to typify the firms according to the employment models matrix. We are interested in confirming whether the firm's attempts to introduce new HRM practices forced them to move on both axes of the matrix simultaneously, and under what circumstances they are more likely to do so.

The group of firms selected for study were chosen on the basis of strategic criteria neutralizing the effect of non observed factors. These strategic selection criteria are: a) firms that have recently introduced some sort of the so-called "new productive systems", a common indicator of firm propensity to change work management; b) firms with recent positive financial performance; and c) firms of large, medium and small size (excluding those with fewer than 50 employees), as well as long-established and start-up firms. A final criterion was added, to wit, that all firms belong to the main industrial sectors in the area, which turned out to be two sectors: metal engineering and chemicals. A group of fourteen firms was finally studied, of which I will discuss only three.

All these firms are located in the region of Asturias (Spain). This region presents, compared to a standard European context, a pair of relevant features for the purposes of this study. First, Asturias possesses a labor market characterized by the presence of a few large firms in basic industries (mining and energy, iron and steel, metal engineering and chemicals, mainly), some of them state-owned, shaping an industrial sector with a clear predominance of traditional internal markets. Second, transnational corporations, usually open to the type of innovations hereby described, are scarce in the region, thus retarding diffusion of these practices. As a result of that, the region is considered, by and large, a “hostile” industrial context for these innovations.

The first set of observations on selected firms were carried out through semi-structured interviews with the senior personnel executive in each firm. Their HR strategic choices, recruiting and hiring practices, training activities, remuneration and promotion systems, and communication with workers representative bodies were the topics examined. In a second step, an interview on similar topics was held with a member of the work council in firms with collective contracts. In a third step, an interview with a group of new employees was carried out in those firms with a significant amount of hiring during the last years, addressing their work trajectories and their feelings on them. Comparing these three interview results allows me to distinguish the rhetoric from the single facts. Managers tend to speak in terms like “in this company we are implementing such and such practices...”, that sometimes means nothing more than an attempt to do it or the mere existence of an external report on the matter. All the interviews were carried out from January to June 1996 and were recorded and transcribed.

4. THREE FIRM CASES

Probably the single feature shared by all the studied firms is their contact with the HRM philosophy and practices. Most of personnel managers interviewed identified a change in work management in the mid-80’s, and in an almost unanimous way, their answers had frequent references to the “workforce as the principal company asset” or to “the crucial significance of active employee commitment”. In the recent history of all these firms there are attempts to implement portions of the new HRM practices. It should be mentioned that they make up a group of successful firms surviving an intense process of market deregulation and internationalization.

The origin and this turning point in work management philosophy varies from firm to firm. There is a group of firms, mainly plants of multinational groups with a complex divisional and geographical structure, which are leaders in their markets. In these firms, this philosophy is received as a part of the corporate culture, and their own HRM style is a strategic resource of internal control and is transmitted with relative success to all the plants and operative levels. A second group, both multinational plants and local firms, were forced by internationalization to a continuous process of adjustment and improvement of their short term financial results. In these cases, this philosophy has been introduced as a side-effect of technological and organizational changes. In a third group, mostly local and medium size firms, the introduction of a new technology or the quality requirements (ISO 2000 or similar) compels them to alter the work organization (i.e., multi-functional jobs or teamwork), something usually brought about by an entrepreneur or manager in a very pragmatic and situational style.

All studied firms are pushed by growing competition to raise their work management level along the individualism scale. The specific location in that scale seems to depend upon their market position and their organizational complexity. However, their location in the horizontal (collectivism) scale seems to depend more upon their own firm identity and their labor relations pattern.

In what follows I present in some detail the results of only three firm cases. The three of them have incorporated new personnel in the last years, so that they are cases well suited for the observation of the HRM practices we are most interested in. These firms have been chosen because they represent, out of the whole sample, the most typical configurations of employment models, according to the individualism/collectivism matrix. The rest of the cases mostly present very similar configurations, with the only exception being small sized local firms with a paternalist entrepreneur, although these firms have hired a small number of employees and have displayed few HRM practices, which makes them less interesting as singular cases.

The most outstanding features of the three firms I study, called A, B and C from now on, are summarized in Table 1. Firstly, features globally characterizing the firm (production, size and market position) are introduced; secondly, the main factors affecting the diffusion of HRM practices, production systems (technology and organizational structure) and corporate identity, are specified; finally, a third factor on the collective labor relations is added.

Table 1

MAIN FEATURES OF THE THREE FIRM CASES

<p>FIRM A</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established in 1953, subsidiary of a French multinational with some other plants in Spain • 625 personnel (325 in automobile glass production unit); several personnel cut-backs in the last twelve years • Leading European automobile glass producer in expanding market. A few European clients with constant pressure on costs and quality
<p>Production system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensive and recent automation • Recent job reclassification to only three grades. Sub-contracting of auxiliary activities • Failed attempt to introduce semi-autonomous teams. In project: business units and quality circles
<p>Firm identity/Management styles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Old plant with long local tradition • Strong strategic control by corporation headquarters on plant managers • Top managers and staff managers with careers in the corporation itself
<p>Labor relations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of union membership. Inter-union competency at firm level • Three year collective agreement, negotiated through national multi-plant work council • Paternalism traditions on hiring and benefits. Personnel cut-backs through early-retirements and no layoffs • Frequent strikes during bargaining agreements and during attempted changes on work organization (shifts; sub-contracting)

Table 1 (cont.)

<p>FIRM B</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Established in 1991, as subsidiary of American chemical multinational Manufacturing trade-mark synthetic fibers . International expanding market of a product that is input to external clients or other plants in the corporation group 390 personnel and growing (new plant units being opened)
<p>Production system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highly mechanized process Attempt to set a learning organization. Multi-functional jobs, teamwork and self-organization (“bubbles”)
<p>Firm identity/Management styles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recently established plant and major foreign investment in the region Strong corporate culture with emphasis on work safety and health, continuous learning and teamwork values Top managers with mobility and careers within group, highly committed to corporate culture
<p>Labor relations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No union representation; neither work council nor collective agreement; individual contracts for all employees

<p>FIRM C</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Established in 1992, subsidiary of German multinational with previous presence in Spain Manufacturing drag-rolling platforms and airport fingers. Leader in expanding market with very few high-quality competitors 295 personnel and growing
<p>Production system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assembly technology. Small series under request Strong quality requirements and control (ISO 2000) in a semi-automated system
<p>Firm-corporation identity/Management styles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very recently established plant, located in an old industrial area (mining basin) with very depressed economy Some managers with pro-unions styles were purposely sought to run the new plant
<p>Labor relations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collective bargaining through local unions before starting the operations of the company. Work council promoted and supported by management Paternalist traditions in the multinational group

Firm A is one among several Spanish branches of a French multinational group, that is the first glass producer in Europe. The establishment has three operative units, a R+D centre for the whole European group, a basic glass production plant and a car glass

manufacturing plant. This last unit, studied here, provides glass for the main European car producers, a market with constant pressure on price and quality. This firm experienced an ongoing process of adjustment, leading to a 50% personnel reduction between 1983 (1,200 personnel) and 1996 (625 personnel). These cut-backs have been semi-agreed with the unions pre-retirements schemes and voluntary layoffs, always without dismissals. It is a firm strongly dependent on headquarters strategic decisions, with plant managers with no evident management style. The firm has made large investments in a highly automatized technology and has a personnel with long length-of-service. It is heavily unionized (about 80%). Their labor relations can be qualified as traditional and of low trust. All these features define a case very close to the so-called *bargained constitutional* type.

Firm B is a plant owned by the European division of an American multinational recently installed and without previous presence in Spain. It manufactures synthetic fibers, with its own trade mark, supplying other plants of the same group and other clients in the international market. Its localisation in “a very little attractive” area for foreign investment has some importance: it has been the largest investment in the region during the last twenty years, and has built three different factories at nearly a cost of a billion dollars, a third of it being subsidized by the state. This plant has symbolised the “new image” of an old industrial territory. The firm seems to have successfully transmitted to all its personnel, through a very careful selection and training process, a strong corporate culture, based on the values of safety, teamwork, and continuous learning. In the community, it has spread an image of a company highly committed to the welfare of its personnel and also is concerned with community interests, mainly environmental issues. The firm uses a process technology halfway between high mechanization and automation. So far, it has succeeded in avoiding any union influence: it has not unionised employees, no work council --in spite of being mandatory under the Spanish labor law-- and it only contracts on an individual basis. All this suggest we are facing a *sophisticated human relations* model.

Firm C has also been recently created and it is a branch of a German multinational with some other previous plants in Spain. With its own technology, the firm produces rolling corridors and escalators for Southern-Europe and Latin America, in an expanding market with only two or three other suppliers. It is located in a coal-mining zone, with financial support from the regional economic promotion agencies and with total

sympathy from local officials and unions. The firm managers shows a “somewhat German style”, with pro-union attitudes --the senior HRM manager is a former union leader--, although they do not show a strong corporate culture. Instead they are pragmatically oriented. The productive system is a sort of mechanised assembly of large units under request. This firm has sought and favoured a context of cooperative labor relations, going as far as signing a collective contract with local unions before starting its operations. The work council, supported by the management itself, is formed by union members who are simultaneously skilled and prestigious workers at the shopfloor level. This set of features defines this case as belonging to a *modern paternalism* type.

Now I will present the set of HRM practices in the spheres most affecting the new employees: staffing process, job training, and earnings and promotion systems. In Table 2 a synopsis of these three types of practices is included. Regarding the staffing process I distinguish, for reasons later exposed, the workforce classification from recruitment to selection.

Table 2

MAIN HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES

FIRM A
<p>Workforce segments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stable core (75-80%): highly skilled technicians and line managers with experience and languages knowledge; three job grade for workers • Group of workers with temporary contracts in subsidiary activities and for peak production cycles.
<p>Recruitment and selection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local newspapers advertising, company data base • Proficiency and psychological tests; personal interviews
<p>Job training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial: course of a week on firm product, production process and safety; on-the-job training. Technical and executive staff: three month prior-to-job training • Continuous: courses on technology, computers, safety and ISO 9000. In centers of the group or in regional agency (CFNT). Executive and technical staff subject to continuous training
<p>Earnings and promotion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed salary+collective incentives on production for all the personnel (never greater than 10% of the salary) • Few promotion opportunities given the characteristics of plant and workforce • Internal bids for vacancies. Promotion decisions based on proficiency tests and line managers discretion
FIRM B
<p>Workforce segments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stable core (90%): technicians, administrative staff and workers • Subcontracted personnel (10%) on a permanent basis "outside of the corporation"
<p>Recruitment and selection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local newspapers advertising and external agency • Pre-selection among thousands of candidates • Exhaustive selection process assisted by external agency: 3 days testing, group dynamics and interviews with participation workmates-to-be
<p>Job training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial: intensive training program previous to entrance. Many psychosocial issues • Continuous: In all workforce grades and as central part of the corporate strategy
<p>Earnings and promotion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed wage, slightly above local industry wages • Job evaluation with a single set of compensating factors. No fixed occupational hierarchy • Bonus linked to safety standards and excellent performance. Flexible benefits package. Profit sharing linked to the length-of-service • Salary promotion offered individually and linked to skills improvement, performance appraisal and responsibilities.

Table 2 (cont.)

FIRM C
<p>Workforce segments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Founding core": skilled technicians and workers with professional expertise (20%) • Young semi-skilled workers (60%) • Flexible segment: low-skilled workers with temporary contracts
<p>Recruitment and selection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Founding core": intensive recruitment and severe skills and expertise requirements • Semi-skilled segment: informal and less intensive selection (apprenticeship, in-practice contracts, previous temporary engagements)
<p>Job training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial: courses of several weeks on product, followed by long tutored-on-the-job training • Continuous: technical content (ISO 9000 and company technology).
<p>Earnings and promotion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Company collective agreement through union representative • Fixed salary +collective incentives (10-15% of salary). Length-of service is not rewarded • Opportunities for promotion. Informal actions of the company to maintain career expectations with annual promotions. • Promotion decisions: Proficiency testing and line managers decision

4. 1. Staffing process

Under one of the basic HRM assumptions, the entry process into the firm describes a path going from a *psychometric* towards a *social* model (Illes and Salaman 1995). Under the former, the aim is to reach the highest number of candidates possessing a pre-defined range of competencies for a specialized job profile. Under the latter, what is above all sought is an expectations matching between potential employees and firm, a "realistic" negotiation of the contract (the psychological and the legal ones) and a socialization for future organizational role. The entry process is understood as a "psychosocial production" of the employee. The social model of staffing represents an ideal that may be materialised in several degrees in the firm selection practices, but possibly favoured by the local labor market properties. Nevertheless, the critical aspect of these practices does not rest on recruitment and selection techniques, but on the way that entry job positions are structured.

The three firms tend to define the entry jobs through high formal skills requirements, never accepting employees under FP2 (post-secondary vocational

education grade in Spain), even for automated and routine jobs (as the types of jobs in Firm A). In the three cases, previous professional experience is also required, although this experience is defined more as a process of personal maturity and work socialization rather than a process a specific skills accumulation. The three firm include psychosocial requirements in job profiles, these requirements being defined in such unprecise terms as “flexibility”, “thrilling”, “learning willingness”, “matching” “good feeling towards the firm”; but the candidates are not systematically scrutinised about these requirements, which explains why the interviews end up playing the central role in the whole selection process. As an example, in the Firm B, the closest to a social staffing model, the worker’s profile is defined as that of a “a normal person”, “easy-going for teamwork”, thus stressing the socialization availability over strong personalities. Some young workers referred to their selection experience as paradoxical: other candidates showing high communication and leadership skills in the interactive testing were not selected, whereas they were amazed at having been selected because “they hadn’t stood out at all”.

The recruitment process becomes less important when there is a labor market with youth workforce supply excess and with sufficient skills. The firms have to revert to specialised agencies only to recruit technical or managerial staff with high professional skills. For most of the worker jobs, the recruitment through newspapers provides a large number of candidates. The personnel data bases and the links with vocational training agencies (Instituto Nacional de Empleo and Centro para la Formación en Nuevas Tecnologías) are even more frequent recruitment methods than newspaper advertising.

The selection process in the three cases hardly moves away from a very conventional pattern: pre-selection based on bios, proficiency tests and personal interviews. External agencies are usually in charge of the first two steps. This procedure involves no highly-formalised testing. In these firms, proficiency tests are generic and are used to filter out an excess volume of candidates. Moreover, it becomes increasingly evident that interviews with future line managers are the key step of the process and, therefore, the most decisive traits are self-presentation skills and attitude toward firm and job. Thus, Firm B has put into practice a selection process based on these principles: firstly, after media announcements it receives a disproportionate quantity of applications (20.000 for some 300 posts); secondly, it pre-selects through bios and standard psychological testing; finally, the selective step is carried out in a three day session,

where candidates are submitted to different interactive testing and personal interviews. In this last step, external experts, line managers and future workmates take part in the assessment process.

There are external factors that allow these firms to take advantage of a social model without displaying sophisticated techniques and at a reasonable cost. In a local youth labor market with only a few “firms with future”, an employment opportunity in any of these firms is felt by young candidates as a unique chance to consolidate his/her professional and personal expectations. Furthermore, most young employees, with post-secondary education, have been socialized in a competitive work culture, where a positive disposition to accept any task, a favourable attitude towards effort and learning, and a self-presentation as “willing employee” are crucial resources for obtaining employment. Thus, it is no surprise that young employees perceive their selection process and their initial phase in the firm as “very positive experience”, “of fair competition for the job”, “where I learnt a lot” and “where there was a good workplace atmosphere”.

What makes a difference in these three cases is the way in which entry jobs are structured. Firm B defines the entry positions following an *inclusive* pattern, according to which all firm employees are contracted on a permanent basis and rewarded by the same criteria, leaving “outside of the corporation”, and in the hands of sub-contracted firms, a few auxiliary activities (cleaning, safety and catering). Firms A and C follow a *internal dualization* pattern, distinguishing between definitive and temporary jobs, the latter being a “testing phase” to gain access to definitive positions. This dualization pattern confines itself to, in Firm A, a “primary” group of permanent employees and “secondary” group of contingent employees, the size of them being dependent of peak production periods. In Firm C a group of “expert” employees is formed as opposed to a group of “apprentices”. This dualization would be out of reach had the labor contract deregulation not already been there. Thanks to this institutional change firms have managed to “stabilize” a personnel segment, almost exclusively made up of young employees, linked to different types of temporary contracts. Thus, the external segmentation is reproduced inside the firm as “testing personnel group”.

4. 2. Job training

The HRM literature has as one of its central principles the strategic commitment to training. It tends to stress training contents (multi-functional skills, socialization in the firm culture), but tends to neglect training management itself (how their contents are established, who has access to training and its impact on earnings and promotion). Nonetheless, training management problems play a crucial roles in firms under collective labor relations.

The growing presence of training in HRM practices is a shared feature in the three cases. These firms have been increasing their resources devoted to initial and continuous training, have a staff executive in charge of year training plan and have become increasingly open to individual (permits for training) and collective (engagements in public Continuous Training Schemes) initiatives. This stress on job training is favoured by the presence of public agencies (Instituto Nacional de Empleo, Agencia Regional de Empleo, Centro de Formación para las Nuevas Tecnologías) and programs (Formación Continua en la Empresa).

With the exception of Firm B, the strategic nature of on-the-job training and its orientation towards multi-functionality is unclear. Firms A and C enter these practices not from a HR global strategy, but as practices temporarily linked to new technology start-ups or to quality standards requirements (ISO 2000, for instance). In a similar way, the psychosocial contents of training are almost exclusively limited to professional and managerial segments (mainly courses on TQM, leadership and teamwork).

Firm B is a good example of the fact that multi-functional job training is conditioned by the organizational structure. The basic organizational units in this firm are functional teams known as “bubbles”. There are “development and communication bubbles” with competencies on every personnel issue and in charge of the training plans, which brings the side-effect that every employee improves his/her knowledge of the productive system and several personnel management techniques. The training program covers a broad range of contents (from technical ones, to language courses to giving-up-smoking programs). These training activities are seen as part of the social benefits package and, sometimes, employee relatives are accepted.

Job training management introduces a nuance in HRM practices that differentiates the three cases more clearly. In Firm B it does not seem to present problematic aspects. The firm accomplishes a long initial training program, similar for

every occupational category, guaranteeing multi-functional abilities and corporate culture socialization, specially underlining continuous learning as an employee responsibility. In this vein, employees are encouraged to participate actively in training programs: technicians and managers know that multi-functional skills accumulation favour their promotion horizons; while workers get a more generic training, which makes them moveable among firms.

In Firm C job training seems to be transmitted without major problems, although through a different procedure. The bulk of initial training is tutored-on-the-job, the tutor being a “founding core” employee. Continuous training is designed in cooperation with the work council, which facilitates the access to semi-public agencies financial support. Training is very specific, so that it can not be marketed easily outside the company and its cost is compensated by the wage differential of “testing personnel group”.

In Firm A, on the contrary, training management motivates conflict. The firm needs to introduce multi-functional skills to enable job rotation and non-technical contents (teamwork, problem solving and continuous improvement) to reach the high quality product requirements. But the firm fails to make those goals compatible with work council claims: co-deciding who must receive training, what the contents must be and how to make the skill improvements correspond to the wages.

4. 3. Earnings and promotion

Here we have we find the biggest discrepancy between the HRM philosophy and real firm practices. In the three cases, fixed salary, through either collective or individual contract, is kept dominant. Earnings directly linked to performance tend to be collective (a very low percentage of total salary) and are perceived as a part of fixed salary, since it is very rarely withheld. Other variable pay schemes scarcely exist; when they do, employees do not assign them any relevance, because they are considered to be insignificant in absolute terms or because the relative wage differentials are seen as very narrow.

The collective or individual labor contract does not change the earning system as a whole but it does help to introduce a very relevant nuance. The three firms shared a fixed wage system by grades, established by job evaluation procedures and based on skill levels and responsibilities. What make a difference is that Firm B, with individual

contracting, settles with discretion job categories, pay grades and promotion schemes, what is out the way of firms with collective contract. This greater freedom of Firm B has two main consequences: a) making use of the same job evaluation system for all personnel, wage structure appears to be more fair ("in this firm, everybody --from the CEO to the bottom employee-- is paid by the same criteria"); and b) there is a greater variety of pay grades inside each job category, so that there are more salary promotion opportunities regardless of job promotion, and there is also a consequent greater power in the hands of line managers over the promotion decisions.

In the three firms the young workers agree that the career concept is alien to their situation and regard it as an incentive only available to professional and managerial staff. In Firms A and C the job categories are very fixed and have been reduced to three levels in the worker's segment: grade promotions occur only when there are vacancies. In Firm B salary promotions are more frequent, but the job promotions are very infrequent. However, the lack of career opportunities is not felt as a source of dissatisfaction by young workers: an expression like "we are lucky enough to be in good company and to earn a good salary..." is the usual answer to any question on promotion.

4. 4. Initial work trajectories

The staffing practices at the disposal of these firms present some differences but also quite a few similarities. The differences have to do with the intensity of the practices rather than with the choice among different sets of practices. The employment model allows for a greater or a smaller efficacy in the use of them. The collective dimension has a crucial role to play on such efficacy and on the perceptions of the practices by employees.

The initial work trajectories provide greater variety than the sets of practices themselves. Firm B frames the entry phase in a way mirroring the *ordinate* trajectories suited for labor internal markets: the entry can be made without previous work experience, recruitment is extensive, selection is intensive, the contract is permanent and promotion opportunities based on performance appraisal are given. Young workers look at their own trajectories in a somewhat different way: they find no incentives in promotion, they do not identify performance appraisal with objective criteria (they rather

see their medium-term promotion as guided by a principle of authority), and their effort - defined by the firm culture as “continuous learning” -- is always subjectively assessed.

In the other two cases, the entry phase, having HRM practices similar to those of Firm B follows a very different pattern. Inside these firms, job structure is dualized, entry jobs and definite jobs are separated, the former adopting the nature of “testing positions” with a lower status. In these “testing positions”, young employees do not fight for salary or grade promotion, but for reaching a position from which promotion competition is possible. Some further evidence suggests that the culmination of this testing phase and the jump into a career phase are linked, on the one hand, to workers performance and, on the other, to the young candidate’s life cycle. In this way, this change in job status parallels transitions in the worker’s private life (family and residence settlement).

This “testing phase” works with a slightly different logic in cases A and C. In Firm C, it takes the shape of an *informal apprenticeship* modality: there are entry jobs in core occupations, with an informal apprentice status, in the sense that apprenticeship does not grant a formal certification and the legal link to the firm may be any kind of temporary contracts. The achievement of a definitive position depends on the accomplishment of an “ordinate” apprenticeship (in a different job and with relative employment continuity) and on the assessment the firm has made of the young employee performance and attitudes during the “testing phase”.


In Firm A the entry jobs segment cannot be arranged as an apprenticeship. The young employees’ transitional trajectories into the stable segment can be seen as a *semi-external queue*: the “testing phase” has been stretched out, it registers more employment (inside and outside this firm) and unemployment episodes, it does not show signs of an ordinate professional apprenticeship, and the queue order (the probability of getting a stable job in the firm) depends less on the observed performance and more on the production conjunctures and kinship and neighbouring relations.

4. 5. Tensions of change

The attempt to present employment models and HRM practices as standard types mirrors with an image of integrity and stability they actually lack. There is certainly a specific set of practices in each firm. The case studies also show that there are tentative

practices that fail to materialize, and that conflicts over their introduction or about how they must be oriented once started arise as well. There is, indeed, a tension of change that makes up a crucial aspect in HRM implementation. In the cases under study, these tensions also fit into the employment models matrix (Figure 2). In all the cases, these tensions point in different directions, although some of them appear to be more solid -- those represented by the thick arrows in Figure 2.

Figure 2
Tensions of change in employment models



Firm A shows a very fragile balance between individualism and collectivism. The combination of an adversarial tradition of labor relations, with a propensity to paternalism and a strong pressure toward individualistic practices shape a very unstable situation. Both management and work council move in different directions. The management tries to implement organizational or technological changes, with straightforward consequences on work management (shifts, variable pay, quality circles). These changes are, nevertheless, conditioned by the corporation investment policies, in whose definition not even the plant managers, let alone the personnel managers, participate. The work council stands for more paternalist practices, but only gets a portion of a broader modern paternalist set. With almost no participation at all in the

strategic decisions -- a more efficacious participation would require a European work council to match the corporation--, the council is forced to negotiate the consequences of the new practices but fails to broaden its consultation rights. As a second best solution, it succeeds in getting paternalist benefits, such as more egalitarian wages, personnel cut backs without layoffs and a certain control over the new contracts.

A more solid and stable set of practices seems to be at the disposal of Firm B. At the least, no strong tension of change has been observed. There is no hint of any work council constitution or collective contract, let alone unionization. But a shift towards a bargained constitutional type cannot be discounted, as the firm size increases and the links with the region get settled. The only sources of dissatisfaction leaked out by the young employees, that could involve potential tensions of change, amount to few complaints about some aspects of work organization, such as the annoyance produced by shifts and the stress of some jobs. Other potential sources of conflict in this model, such as wage differentials and promotion decisions, do not seem to bring about major tensions. Anyway, these facts should be placed in the context of a firm in which all the interviewees, from the HR senior executive to every one of the employees, tend to see themselves as “members of the company”, to express themselves through a “we” instead of a “I” and to downplay the occasions for conflict (“in this firm you can always pose a problem because you are certain to be listened to”). The very probable firm size increase as well as the increment in the personnel length-of-service could push down HRM practices, towards traditional paternalism model. If any industry union intervention should take place, it would be similarly oriented.

Firm C also experiences a quite stable situation. Neither the role of the work council, cooperating with management and monopolizing the communication with employees, nor the informal apprenticeship practice, show any tendency to be altered in the short term. But some of the factors, internal as well as external, on which that stability is based could change. The firm’s strategic decisions are taken by the multinational group. So far, in a startup and growth phase, all these decisions follow a “positive direction”, the work council going hand-in-hand with the firm, without claiming for more consultation resources and codecision voices. In the near future, these decisions could be different (significant size or cost reductions) and the council could ask for more voice resources in this process. Under this assumption, it is also possible that workers, who are aware of the council being dependent on management and its isolation from

industry union, will claim for a bigger union influence. In such a scenario, it is unlikely that this firm would move up toward practices of a sophisticated consultative type. Unions could then exact from the firm the right to negotiate the collective agreement, thus achieving greater control of “informal apprenticeship” and restricting the firm’s freedom to decide upon contracts modalities and wages of those temporary employees. In such a situation, not at all uncommon in Spanish labor market, it is much more likely that the firm would seek solutions more akin to a *bargained constitutional* option.

5. DISCUSSION

This study has demonstrated the existence of various sets of practices of work management, which are not adequately understood in the literature on the new HRM, due perhaps to the fact that this literature refers mainly to the singular experience of US. Furthermore, it has been shown that this variety is linked to different types of employment models, figured out as typical combinations of two basic dimensions: a dimension that captures the influence of management styles (individualism) and another dimension that takes into account the influence of the collective aspect of employment relations (collectivism). It has been demonstrated that it is crucial to pay attention to those two dimensions of the employment models in order to understand the variety of practices related to the staffing of new personnel and, above all, how those practices contribute to mould the work trajectories of young employees.

Although a case study compels us to be very cautious in generalizing the results, my conclusions lay out some relevant theoretical elements for research on employment models and job mobility. In a first sense, there are good reasons to think that the new employment models are more of a hybrid than what a good part of the theoretical literature imagines. This is a very similar argument to the one proposed by Hyman (1994b) and Purcell (1993) for the European context, which nevertheless has yielded very little empirical work. In the same vein, these results highlight the importance of the external-to-firm institutional contexts in order to explain the implementation and diffusion of the new forms of work management (Kochan and Osterman 1994).

In a second sense, the initial work trajectories analysed in this study confirm the need for a reorientation of mobility studies suggested by Baron (1994), taking importance away from occupations and industries as determinants of job mobility, and

giving a greater influence to organizational affiliation (different organizational cultures and firm life cycles) and to organizational contexts (changes in labor relations institutions and local cultures).

REFERENCES

Beer, Michael, Spector, B. Lawrence P. Quinn Mills D. Walton R. 1985. *Human Resource Management: A General Manager Perspective*. New York: Free Press.

Baron, James N. 1994. "Reflections on Recent Generations of Mobility Research" in: David B Gusky, ed. *Social Stratification in Sociological Perspective: Class, Race and Gender*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 384-393.

Castells, Manuel, Esteban Fernández, Rosario Gandoy, Rodolfo Gutiérrez, Rafael Myro and Juan A. Vázquez. 1994. *Estrategias para la reindustrialización de Asturias*. Madrid: Civitas.

Fox, Alan. 1966. *Sociology of Work and Industry*. London: Collins-Macmillan.

Fox, Alan. 1974. *Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations*. London: Farber

García-Blanco, José M. and Rodolfo Gutiérrez. 1989. "El declive de las áreas de antigua industrialización". *Sociología del Trabajo* 8, 3-29.

García-Blanco, José M. and Rodolfo Gutiérrez. 1995. "La inserción laboral de los jóvenes: entrada al mercado de trabajo y movilidad laboral". *Revista Asturiana de Economía* 2, 55-80.

García-Blanco, José M. and Rodolfo Gutiérrez. 1996. *La inserción laboral de los jóvenes* (forthcoming).

Gutiérrez, Rodolfo. 1992. "La lógica social del declive económico" in: Carlos Moya, Alfonso Pérez-Agote, Juan Salcedo and José F. Tezanos, eds. *Ensayos de teoría sociológica*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

Hyman, Richard. 1994a. "Industrial Relations in Western Europe: An Era of Ambiguity?". *Industrial Relations* 33, 1-24.

Hyman, Richard. 1994b. "Theory and Industrial Relations". *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 33-2, 165-180

Illes, Paul and Graeme Salaman. 1995. "Recruitment, selection and assessment", in: John Storey 1995, 203-233.

- Kochan, Thomas A., Harry C. Katz and Robert McKersie. 1987. *The Transformation of American Industrial Relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kochan, Thomas A. and Paul Osterman. 1994. *The Mutual Gains Enterprise*. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.
- Legge, Karen. 1995. "HRM, Rethoric, Reality and Hidden Agenda", in: Storey, John, op. cit., 33-59.
- Marchington, Mick and Phillip Parker. 1990. *Changing Patterns of Employee Relationship*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Purcell, John. 1987. "Mapping Management Styles in Employee Relations". *Journal of Management Studies* 24, 533-548.
- Purcell, John. 1993. "The Challenge of Human Resource Management for Industrial Relations Research and Practice". *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 64-1, 6-23
- Purcell, John and Bruce M. Ahlstrand. 1994. *Human Resource Management in a Multi-Divisional Company*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spilerman, Seymour. 1977. "Careers, Labor Market Structure and Socioeconomic Achievement", *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, 551-593.
- Storey, John. 1992. *Developments in the Management Human Resources*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Storey, John. 1995. *Human Resource Management*. Londres: Routledge.
- Storey, John and Keith Sisson, eds. 1993. *Managing Human Resources and Industrial Relations*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES
RELACIÓN DE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO:

- Doc. 001/88 JUAN A. VAZQUEZ GARCIA.- Las intervenciones estatales en la minería del carbón.
- Doc. 002/88 CARLOS MONASTERIO ESCUDERO.- Una valoración crítica del nuevo sistema de financiación autonómica.
- Doc. 003/88 ANA ISABEL FERNANDEZ ALVAREZ; RAFAEL GARCIA RODRIGUEZ; JUAN VENTURA VICTORIA.- Análisis del crecimiento sostenible por los distintos sectores empresariales.
- Doc. 004/88 JAVIER SUAREZ PANDIELLO.- Una propuesta para la integración multijurisdiccional.
- Doc. 005/89 LUIS JULIO TASCÓN FERNANDEZ; JOSE MANUEL DIEZ MODINO.- La modernización del sector agrario en la provincia de León.
- Doc. 006/89 JOSE MANUEL PRADO LORENZO.- El principio de gestión continuada: Evolución e implicaciones.
- Doc. 007/89 JAVIER SUAREZ PANDIELLO.- El gasto público del Ayuntamiento de Oviedo (1982-88).
- Doc. 008/89 FELIX LOBO ALEU.- El gasto público en productos industriales para la salud.
- Doc. 009/89 FELIX LOBO ALEU.- La evolución de las patentes sobre medicamentos en los países desarrollados.
- Doc. 010/90 RODOLFO VAZQUEZ CASIELLES.- Investigación de las preferencias del consumidor mediante análisis de conjunto.
- Doc. 011/90 ANTONIO APARICIO PEREZ.- Infracciones y sanciones en materia tributaria.
- Doc. 012/90 MONTSERRAT DIAZ FERNANDEZ; CONCEPCION GONZALEZ VEIGA.- Una aproximación metodológica al estudio de las matemáticas aplicadas a la economía.
- Doc. 013/90 EQUIPO MECO.- Medidas de desigualdad: un estudio analítico
- Doc. 014/90 JAVIER SUAREZ PANDIELLO.- Una estimación de las necesidades de gastos para los municipios de menor dimensión.
- Doc. 015/90 ANTONIO MARTINEZ ARIAS.- Auditoría de la información financiera.
- Doc. 016/90 MONTSERRAT DIAZ FERNANDEZ.- La población como variable endógena
- Doc. 017/90 JAVIER SUAREZ PANDIELLO.- La redistribución local en los países de nuestro entorno.

- Doc. 018/90 **RODOLFO GUTIERREZ PALACIOS; JOSE MARIA GARCIA BLANCO.**- "Los aspectos invisibles" del declive económico: el caso de Asturias.
- Doc. 019/90 **RODOLFO VAZQUEZ CASIELLES; JUAN TRESPALACIOS GUTIERREZ.**- La política de precios en los establecimientos detallistas.
- Doc. 020/90 **CANDIDO PAÑEDA FERNANDEZ.**- La demarcación de la economía (seguida de un apéndice sobre su relación con la Estructura Económica).
- Doc. 021/90 **JOAQUIN LORENCES.**- Margen precio-coste variable medio y poder de monopolio.
- Doc. 022/90 **MANUEL LAFUENTE ROBLEDO; ISIDRO SANCHEZ ALVAREZ.**- El T.A.E. de las operaciones bancarias.
- Doc. 023/90 **ISIDRO SANCHEZ ALVAREZ.**- Amortización y coste de préstamos con hojas de cálculo.
- Doc. 024/90 **LUIS JULIO TASCÓN FERNANDEZ; JEAN-MARC BUIGUES.**- Un ejemplo de política municipal: precios y salarios en la ciudad de León (1613-1813).
- Doc. 025/90 **MYRIAM GARCIA OLALLA.**- Utilidad de las teorías de las opciones para la administración financiera de la empresa.
- Doc. 026/91 **JOAQUIN GARCIA MURCIA.**- Novedades de la legislación laboral (octubre 1990 - enero 1991)
- Doc. 027/91 **CANDIDO PAÑEDA.**- Agricultura familiar y mantenimiento del empleo: el caso de Asturias.
- Doc. 028/91 **PILAR SAENZ DE JUBERA.**- La fiscalidad de planes y fondos de pensiones.
- Doc. 029/91 **ESTEBAN FERNANDEZ SANCHEZ.**- La cooperación empresarial: concepto y tipología (*)
- Doc. 030/91 **JOAQUIN LORENCES.**- Características de la población parada en el mercado de trabajo asturiano.
- Doc. 031/91 **JOAQUIN LORENCES.**- Características de la población activa en Asturias.
- Doc. 032/91 **CARMEN BENAVIDES GONZALEZ.**- Política económica regional
- Doc. 033/91 **BENITO ARRUÑADA SANCHEZ.**- La conversión coactiva de acciones comunes en acciones sin voto para lograr el control de las sociedades anónimas: De cómo la ingenuidad legal prefigura el fraude.
- Doc. 034/91 **BENITO ARRUÑADA SANCHEZ.**- Restricciones institucionales y posibilidades estratégicas.
- Doc. 035/91 **NURIA BOSCH; JAVIER SUAREZ PANDIELLO.**- Seven Hypotheses About Public Choice and Local Spending. (A test for Spanish municipalities).

- Doc. 036/91 **CARMEN FERNANDEZ CUERVO; LUIS JULIO TASCON FERNANDEZ.**- De una olvidada revisión crítica sobre algunas fuentes histórico-económicas: las ordenanzas de la gobernación de la cabecera.
- Doc. 037/91 **ANA JESUS LOPEZ; RIGOBERTO PEREZ SUAREZ.**- Indicadores de desigualdad y pobreza. Nuevas alternativas.
- Doc. 038/91 **JUAN A. VAZQUEZ GARCIA; MANUEL HERNANDEZ MUÑIZ.**- La industria asturiana: ¿Podemos pasar la página del declive?.
- Doc. 039/92 **INES RUBIN FERNANDEZ.**- La Contabilidad de la Empresa y la Contabilidad Nacional.
- Doc. 040/92 **ESTEBAN GARCIA CANAL.**- La Cooperación interempresarial en España: Características de los acuerdos de cooperación suscritos entre 1986 y 1989.
- Doc. 041/92 **ESTEBAN GARCIA CANAL.**- Tendencias empíricas en la conclusión de acuerdos de cooperación.
- Doc. 042/92 **JOAQUIN GARCIA MURCIA.**- Novedades en la Legislación Laboral.
- Doc. 043/92 **RODOLFO VAZQUEZ CASIELLES.**- El comportamiento del consumidor y la estrategia de distribución comercial: Una aplicación empírica al mercado de Asturias.
- Doc. 044/92 **CAMILO JOSE VAZQUEZ ORDAS.**- Un marco teórico para el estudio de las fusiones empresariales.
- Doc. 045/92 **CAMILO JOSE VAZQUEZ ORDAS.**- Creación de valor en las fusiones empresariales a través de un mayor poder de mercado.
- Doc. 046/92 **ISIDRO SANCHEZ ALVAREZ.**- Influencia relativa de la evolución demográfica en el futuro aumento del gasto en pensiónes de jubilación.
- Doc. 047/92 **ISIDRO SANCHEZ ALVAREZ.**- Aspectos demográficos del sistema de pensiones de jubilación español.
- Doc. 048/92 **SUSANA LOPEZ ARES.**- Marketing telefónico: concepto y aplicaciones.
- Doc. 049/92 **CESAR RODRIGUEZ GUTIERREZ.**- Las influencias familiares en el desempleo juvenil.
- Doc. 050/92 **CESAR RODRIGUEZ GUTIERREZ.**- La adquisición de capital humano: un modelo teórico y su contrastación.
- Doc. 051/92 **MARTA IBAÑEZ PASCUAL.**- El origen social y la inserción laboral.
- Doc. 052/92 **JUAN TRESPALACIOS GUTIERREZ.**- Estudio del sector comercial en la ciudad de Oviedo.

- Doc. 053/92 **JULITA GARCIA DIEZ.**- Auditoría de cuentas: su regulación en la CEE y en España. Una evidencia de su importancia.
- Doc. 054/92 **SUSANA MENENDEZ REQUEJO.**- El riesgo de los sectores empresariales españoles: rendimiento requerido por los inversores.
- Doc. 055/92 **CARMEN BENAVIDES GONZALEZ.**- Una valoración económica de la obtención de productos derivados del petróleo a partir del carbón
- Doc. 056/92 **IGNACIO ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ-DEL BOSQUE RODRIGUEZ.**- Consecuencias sobre el consumidor de las actuaciones bancarias ante el nuevo entorno competitivo.
- Doc. 057/92 **LAURA CABIEDES MIRAGAYA.**- Relación entre la teoría del comercio internacional y los estudios de organización industrial.
- Doc. 058/92 **JOSE LUIS GARCIA SUAREZ.**- Los principios contables en un entorno de regulación.
- Doc. 059/92 **Mª JESUS RIO FERNANDEZ; RIGOBERTO PEREZ SUAREZ.**- Cuantificación de la concentración industrial: un enfoque analítico.
- Doc. 060/94 **Mª JOSE FERNANDEZ ANTUÑA.**- Regulación y política comunitaria en materia de transportes.
- Doc. 061/94 **CESAR RODRIGUEZ GUTIERREZ.**- Factores determinantes de la afiliación sindical en España.
- Doc. 062/94 **VICTOR FERNANDEZ BLANCO.**- Determinantes de la localización de las empresas industriales en España: nuevos resultados.
- Doc. 063/94 **ESTEBAN GARCIA CANAL.**- La crisis de la estructura multidivisional.
- Doc. 064/94 **MONTSERRAT DIAZ FERNANDEZ; EMILIO COSTA REPARAZ.**- Metodología de la investigación econométrica.
- Doc. 065/94 **MONTSERRAT DIAZ FERNANDEZ; EMILIO COSTA REPARAZ.**- Análisis Cualitativo de la fecundidad y participación femenina en el mercado de trabajo.
- Doc. 066/94 **JOAQUIN GARCIA MURCIA.**- La supervisión colectiva de los actos de contratación: la Ley 2/1991 de información a los representantes de los trabajadores.
- Doc. 067/94 **JOSE LUIS GARCIA LAPRESTA; Mª VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ URIA.**- Coherencia en preferencias difusas.
- Doc. 068/94 **VICTOR FERNANDEZ; JOAQUIN LORENCES; CESAR RODRIGUEZ.**- Diferencias interterritoriales de salarios y negociación colectiva en España.

- Doc. 069/94 **M^a DEL MAR ARENAS PARRA; M^a VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA.**- Programación clásica y teoría del consumidor.
- Doc. 070/94 **M^a DE LOS ÁNGELES MENÉNDEZ DE LA UZ; M^a VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA.**- Tantos efectivos en los empréstitos.
- Doc. 071/94 **AMELIA BILBAO TEROL; CONCEPCIÓN GONZÁLEZ VEIGA; M^a VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA.**- Matrices especiales. Aplicaciones económicas.
- Doc. 072/94 **RODOLFO GUTIÉRREZ.**- La representación sindical: Resultados electorales y actitudes hacia los sindicatos.
- Doc. 073/94 **VÍCTOR FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO.**- Economías de aglomeración y localización de las empresas industriales en España.
- Doc. 074/94 **JOAQUÍN LORENCES RODRÍGUEZ; FLORENTINO FELGUEROSO FERNÁNDEZ.**- Salarios pactados en los convenios provinciales y salarios percibidos.
- Doc. 075/94 **ESTEBAN FERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ; CAMILO JOSÉ VÁZQUEZ ORDÁS.**- La internacionalización de la empresa.
- Doc. 076/94 **SANTIAGO R. MARÍN ARGÜELLES.**- Análisis de los efectos regionales de la terciarización de ramas industriales a través de tablas input-output. El caso de la economía asturiana.
- Doc. 077/94 **VÍCTOR IGLESIAS ARGÜELLES.**- Tipos de variables y metodología a emplear en la identificación de los grupos estratégicos. Una aplicación empírica al sector detallista en Asturias.
- Doc. 078/94 **MARTA IBÁÑEZ PASCUAL; F. JAVIER MATO DÍAZ.**- La formación no reglada a examen. Hacia un perfil de sus usuarios.
- Doc. 079/94 **IGNACIO A. RODRÍGUEZ-DEL BOSQUE RODRÍGUEZ.**- Planificación y organización de la fuerza de ventas de la empresa.
- Doc. 080/94 **FRANCISCO GONZÁLEZ RODRÍGUEZ.**- La reacción del precio de las acciones ante anuncios de cambios en los dividendos.
- Doc. 081/94 **SUSANA MENÉNDEZ REQUEJO.**- Relaciones de dependencia de las decisiones de inversión, financiación y dividendos.
- Doc. 082/95 **MONTSERRAT DÍAZ FERNÁNDEZ; EMILIO COSTA REPARAZ; M^a del MAR LLORENTE MARRÓN.**- Una aproximación empírica al comportamiento de los precios de la vivienda en España.

- Doc. 083/95 **Mª CONCEPCIÓN GONZÁLEZ VEIGA; Mª VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA.**- Matrices semipositivas y análisis interindustrial. Aplicaciones al estudio del modelo de Sraffa-Leontief.
- Doc. 084/95 **ESTEBAN GARCÍA CANAL.**- La forma contractual en las alianzas domésticas e internacionales.
- Doc. 085/95 **MARGARITA ARGÜELLES VÉLEZ; CARMEN BENAVIDES GONZÁLEZ.**- La incidencia de la política de la competencia comunitaria sobre la cohesión económica y social.
- Doc. 086/95 **VÍCTOR FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO.**- La demanda de cine en España. 1968-1992.
- Doc. 087/95 **JUAN PRIETO RODRÍGUEZ.**- Discriminación salarial de la mujer y movilidad laboral.
- Doc. 088/95 **Mª CONCEPCIÓN GONZÁLEZ VEIGA.**- La teoría del caos. Nuevas perspectivas en la modelización económica.
- Doc. 089/95 **SUSANA LÓPEZ ARES.**- Simulación de fenómenos de espera de capacidad limitada con llegadas y número de servidores dependientes del tiempo con hoja de cálculo.
- Doc. 090/95 **JAVIER MATO DÍAZ.**- ¿Existe sobrecualificación en España?. Algunas variables explicativas.
- Doc. 091/95 **Mª JOSÉ SANZO PÉREZ.**- Estrategia de distribución para productos ; mercados industriales.
- Doc. 092/95 **JOSÉ BAÑOS PINO; VÍCTOR FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO.**- Demanda de cine en España: Un análisis de cointegración.
- Doc. 093/95 **Mª LETICIA SANTOS VIJANDE.**- La política de marketing en las empresas de alta tecnología.
- Doc. 094/95 **RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ CASIELLES; IGNACIO RODRÍGUEZ-DEL BOSQUE; AGUSTÍN RUÍZ VEGA.**- Expectativas y percepciones del consumidor sobre la calidad del servicio. Grupos estratégicos y segmentos del mercado para la distribución comercial minorista.
- Doc. 095/95 **ANA ISABEL FERNÁNDEZ; SILVIA GÓMEZ ANSÓN.**- La adopción de acuerdos estatutarios antiadquisición. Evidencia en el mercado de capitales español.
- Doc. 096/95 **ÓSCAR RODRÍGUEZ BUZNEGO.**- Partidos, electores y elecciones locales en Asturias. Un análisis del proceso electoral del 28 de Mayo.
- Doc. 097/95 **ANA Mª DÍAZ MARTÍN.**- Calidad percibida de los servicios turísticos en el ámbito rural.
- Doc. 098/95 **MANUEL HERNÁNDEZ MUÑIZ; JAVIER MATO DÍAZ; JAVIER BLANCO GONZÁLEZ.**- Evaluating the impact of the European Regional Development Fund: methodology and results in Asturias (1989-1993).

- Doc. 099/96 **JUAN PRIETO; M^a JOSÉ SUÁREZ.** - ¿De tal palo tal astilla?: Influencia de las características familiares sobre la ocupación.
- Doc. 100/96 **JULITA GARCÍA DíEZ; RACHEL JUSSARA VIANNA.** - Estudio comparativo de los principios contables en Brasil y en España.
- Doc. 101/96 **FRANCISCO J. DE LA BALLINA BALLINA.** - Desarrollo de campañas de promoción de ventas.
- Doc. 102/96 **ÓSCAR RODRÍGUEZ BUZNEGO.** - Una explicación de la ausencia de la Democracia Cristiana en España.
- Doc. 103/96 **CÁNDIDO PAÑEDA FERNÁNDEZ.** - Estrategias para el desarrollo de Asturias.
- Doc. 104/96 **SARA M^a ALONSO; BLANCA PÉREZ GLADISH; M^a VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA.** - Problemas de control óptimo con restricciones: Aplicaciones económicas.
- Doc. 105/96 **ANTONIO ÁLVAREZ PINILLA; MANUEL MENÉNDEZ MENÉNDEZ; RAFAEL ÁLVAREZ CUESTA.** - Eficiencia de las Cajas de Ahorro españolas. Resultados de una función de beneficio.
- Doc. 106/96 **FLORENTINO FELGUEROSO.** - Industrywide Collective Bargaining, Wages Gains and Black Labour Market in Spain.
- Doc. 107/96 **JUAN VENTURA.** - La competencia gestionada en sanidad: Un enfoque contractual
- Doc. 108/96 **MARÍA VICTORIA RODRÍGUEZ URÍA; ELENA CONSUELO HERNÁNDEZ.** - Elección social. Teorema de Arrow.
- Doc. 109/96 **SANTIAGO ÁLVAREZ GARCÍA.** - Grupos de interés y corrupción política: La búsqueda de rentas en el sector público.
- Doc. 110/96 **ANA M^a GUILLÉN.** - La política de previsión social española en el marco de la Unión Europea.
- Doc. 111/96 **VÍCTOR MANUEL GONZÁLEZ MÉNDEZ.** - La valoración por el mercado de capitales español de la financiación bancaria y de las emisiones de obligaciones.
- Doc. 112/96 **DRA. MARIA VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ URÍA; D. MIGUEL A. LÓPEZ FERNÁNDEZ; D^{ña}. BLANCA M^a PEREZ GLADISH.** - Aplicaciones económicas del Control Óptimo. El problema de la maximización de la utilidad individual del consumo. El problema del mantenimiento y momento de venta de una máquina.
- Doc. 113/96 **OSCAR RODRÍGUEZ BUZNEGO.** - Elecciones autonómicas, sistemas de partidos y Gobierno en Asturias.
- Doc. 114/96 **RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ CASIELLES; ANA M^a DÍAZ MARTÍN.** El conocimiento de las expectativas de los clientes: una pieza clave de la calidad de servicio en el

- turismo.
- Doc. 115/96 **JULIO TASCÓN.** - El modelo de industrialización pesada en España durante el período de entreguerras. -
- Doc. 116/96 **ESTEBAN FERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ; JOSÉ M. MONTES PEÓN; CAMILO J. VÁZQUEZ ORDÁS.** - Sobre la importancia de los factores determinantes del beneficio: Análisis de las diferencias de resultados inter e intraindustriales.
- Doc. 117/96 **AGUSTÍN RUÍZ VEGA; VICTOR IGLESIAS ARGÜELLES.** - Elección de Establecimientos detallistas y conducta de compra de productos de gran consumo. Una aplicación empírica mediante modelos logit.
- Doc. 118/96 **VICTOR FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO.** - Diferencias entre la asistencia al cine nacional y extranjero en España.
- Doc. 119/96 **RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ CASIELLES; IGNACIO A. RODRÍGUEZ DEL BOSQUE; ANA Mª DÍAZ MARTÍN.** - Estructura multidimensional de la calidad de servicio en cadenas de supermercados: desarrollo y validación de la escala calsuper.
- Doc. 120/96 **ANA BELÉN DEL RÍO LANZA.** - Elementos de medición de marca desde un enfoque de marketing.
- Doc. 121/97 **JULITA GARCÍA DÍEZ; CRISTIAN MIAZZO.** - Análisis Comparativo de la Información contable empresarial en Argentina y España.
- Doc. 122/97 **Mª MAR LLORENTE MARRÓN; D. EMILIO COSTA REPARAZ; Mª MONTSERRAT DIAZ FERNÁNDEZ.** - El Marco teórico de la nueva economía de la familia. Principales aportaciones.
- Doc. 123/97 **SANTIAGO ALVAREZ GARCÍA.** - El Estado del bienestar. Orígenes, Desarrollo y situación actual.
- Doc. 124/97 **CONSUELO ABELLÁN COLODRÓN.** - La Ganancia salarial esperada como determinante de la decisión individual de emigrar.
- Doc. 125/97 **ESTHER LAFUENTE ROBLEDO.** - La acreditación hospitalaria: Marco teórico general.
- Doc. 126/97 **JOSE ANTONIO GARAY GONZÁLEZ.** - Problemática contable del reconocimiento del resultado en la empresa constructora.
- Doc. 127/97 **ESTEBAN FERNÁNDEZ; JOSE M. MONTES; GUILLERMO PÉREZ-BUSTAMANTE; CAMILO VÁZQUEZ.** - Barreras a la imitación de la tecnología.

- Doc. 128/97 VICTOR IGLESIAS ARGÜELLES; JUAN A. TRESPALACIOS GUTIERREZ; RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ CASIELLES.- Los resultados alcanzados por las empresas en las relaciones en los canales de distribución.
- Doc. 129/97 LETICIA SANTOS VIJANDE; RODOLFO VÁZQUEZ CASIELLES.- La innovación en las empresas de alta tecnología: Factores condicionantes del resultado comercial.
- Doc. 130/97 RODOLFO GUTIÉRREZ.- Individualism and collectivism in human resource practices: evidence from three case studies.
- Doc. 131/97 VICTOR FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO; JUAN PRIETO RODRÍGUEZ.- Decisiones individuales y consumo de bienes culturales en España.